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CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: POLITICALLY ACTIVE
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
Sections 501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code' exempt
from income taxation2 institutions3 "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific... or educational purposes
.... 1, Organizations exempt under these provisions, however, are
precluded from engaging in substantial political activity under section
501(c)(3). 5 In addition, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has con-
strued this provision as giving it the authority to revoke the tax exempt
status of private schools with racially discriminatory admissions poli-
cies.6 The political activity restrictions of sections 501(c)(3) have been
1. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1976).
2. Id § 501(a). Contributions to organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) are
tax deductible for estate, gift, or income tax purposes. Id §§ 170(c)(2), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii),
2522(a)(2), (b)(2). Organizations qualifying for exemption under § 501(c)(3) are also exempt from
federal social security taxes and federal unemployment taxes. Id §§ 3121(b)(8)(B), 3306(c)(8).
Exemption under these provisions does not extend to civic or social welfare organizations, id
§ 501(c)(4), labor organizations, id § 501(c)(5), business organizations, id § 501(c)(6), pleasure
and recreation organizations, id § 501(c)(7), or fraternal orders, id § 501(c)(8).
3. The number of active entities (individual and group) on the Internal Revenue Service
exempt organizations master file under § 501(c) increased from 673,000 in 1974 to 824,536 in 1979.
C.I.R. ANN. REP. 41 (1975); C.I.R. ANN. REP. 25 (1979). Of the 1979 total, 304,315 are exempt
under § 501(c)(3), and 127,254 under § 501(c)(4) (applying to civic and social welfare organiza-
tions) C.I.R. ANN. REp. 70 (1979). In 1979, the Internal Revenue Service approved 24,892 appli-
cations for exemption under § 501(c)(3), and 2,594 under § 501(c)(4). Id at 96.
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
5. Id The section provides:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion, (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does notparticipate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), anypolitical cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id (emphasis added). Language substantially identical to § 501(c)(3) is found in §§ 170(c)(2),
2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
6. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools.- Hearings
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challenged by church7 leaders8 and commentators 9 as excessive re-
straints on the rights of religious organizations to participate in poli-
tics.'0 Furthermore, the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) as
limiting qualification for tax exempt status to private schools that do
not discriminate on the basis of race continues to receive considerable
opposition." Consequently, numerous attacks in recent years have
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm on Ways and Means, (pt. 1), 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1979) (opening statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue); 291-
92 (statement of William B. Ball) [hereinafter cited as Status Hearings (pl. 1)].
7. The Internal Revenue Code includes in the definition of "church," both conventions and
associations of churches. See I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(l)(A)(i), 508(c)(l)(A) (1976). In addition, it distin-
guishes between the integrated and nonintegrated auxiliaries of religious organizations. Id
§§ 508(c)(I)(A), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), 6043(b)(1). Regulations promulgated by the Department of
Treasury indicate that in order to qualify as an integrated auxiliary, an organization must be tax
exempt under § 501(c)(3), affiliated with a church, and engaged in exclusively religious activity.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i) (1977). Examples of integrated auxiliaries include youth groups,
men's or women's organizations, and religious schools. Nonintegrated auxiliaries include univer-
sities, retirement homes, orphanages, and church-affiliated hospitals. Id
For a discussion of the problems involved in defining "church" in the Code, see Whelan,
"Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885
(1977). See also Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render
Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 64-67 (1976).
8. See generally D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977); Whelan,
Government and the Church, AMERICA, Dec. 16, 1978, at 451. See also Influencing Legislation by
Public Charities. Hearings on H. 13500 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94 Cong.,
2d Sess., 63-64, 75-76, 90-91 (1976) (statement of various church organizations) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H. 13500]. Some church leaders question the appropriateness of involvement by
religious organizations in political activity. Richard John Neuhaus, a highly regarded member of
the Lutheran Church, stated that religious leaders "don't really understand the ethical and philo-
sophical traditions of democracy or how to bring about change in a pluralistic society." A Tide of
Born-Again Politics, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Born-Again PoliticsJ.
See also Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: .4 Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the
InternalRevenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 536 (1981).
9. Burns, ConstitutionalAspects of Church Taxation, 9 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROBS. 646 (1973);
Conable, Tax Impact on Charitable Organizations, 24 CATH. LAW. 251 (1979); Whelan, supra note
7; Note, supra note 8; Comment, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 Hous. L.
Rav. 480 (1979).
10. See, e.g., Clark, The Limitations on PoliticalActivities: A Discordant Note in the Law of
Charities, 46 VA. L. REv. 439 (1960); Fogel, To the LAS., Tis Better to Give than to Lobby" 61
A.B.A.J. 960 (1975); Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of the Re-
strictions on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. 1415 (1973); Note, supra note 8; Note, The
Revenue Code andA Charity's Politics, 73 YALE L.J. 661 (1964).
11. In 1978, the IRS announced a proposed revenue procedure designed to make its policy of
denying or withdrawing the tax exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools more
effectively enforceable. Prop. Rev. Proc., 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). The proposed procedure
generated tremendous public reaction necessitating over four days of public hearings. Wash. Post,
Dec. 6, 1978, § A, at 25, col. 1. See also Status Hearings (Pt. 1), supra note 6, at 294-95 (statement
of William B. Ball); id at 511 (statement of Rev. Dr. Charles V. Bergstrom); id at 912 (statement
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been levelled against the IRS for employing section 501(c)(3) as a
means of regulating the actions and policies of tax exempt
organizations.' 2
The competing interests are clear. On the one hand, religious orga-
nizations resist any attempt to restrict political activity as an unconsti-
tutional interference with the free exercise of religion.'3 Similarly,
private school administrators argue that using tax exemptions to elimi-
nate racial discrimination violates both religion clauses of the first
amendment.' 4 On the other hand, increasingly expansive political ac-
tivity by religious organizations has renewed the legal and constitu-
tional demands for strict separation 5 of church and state. 6 The IRS
of Mark I. Klein). See generally Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under
Attack. Conflicting Goal of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229,
232 (1979); Sanders, Exemptions for Private Schools Threatened by Service's Latest Controversial
Guidelines, 52 J. TAX'N 234, 234 (1979).
12. See infra notes 215-17, 246-47, 284-88 & 315-19 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text. Parts I and II of this Note examine the
constitutional validity of the Internal Revenue Code's political activity restrictions under the first
amendment religion clauses. It should be noted, however, that section 501(c)(3) has also been
attacked under the freedom of speech component of the first amendment and under the equal
protection clause of the fifth amendment. In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Code's lobbying restrictions were un-
constitutional. The court rejected the first amendment claim, but held that section 501(c)(3) vio-
lated the equal protection clause because veteran's organizations exempt under section 501(c)(19)
were not subjected to the same restrictions on lobbying activity as organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(3). See Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(involving a nonprofit "public interest" organization denied exemption by the IRS because it in-
tended to engage in substantial lobbying efforts). In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
reversed, and held that section 501(c)(3) violates neither the free speech guarantee of the first
amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. See Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983). Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist disposed of the
first amendment challenge by relying on Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (first
amendment does not require Congress to subsidize lobbying activities by allowing business ex-
pense deductions, see infra text accompanying notes 129-30). Justice Rehnquist stated that "Con-
gress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for [Taxation with Representation]'s lobbying." 103 S. Ct.
at 2001. In addition, the Court rejected the court of appeal's argument that section 501(c)(3)
should be subjected to strict scrutiny because first amendment rights were "affected." The Court
stated that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because "[t]he sections of the Internal Revenue Code
here at issue do not employ any suspect classification." Id. Thus, the Court upheld section
501(c)(3) as bearing a "rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id.
14. See, e.g., Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 293-95 (statement of William B. Ball); id
at 396 (statement of W. Wayne Allen); id at 503 (statement of George Reed); id at 505-06 (state-
ment of Martin B. Cowan). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 153-55 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-3).
15. The "wall of separation" was a phrase coined by President Jefferson in a letter written to
the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut:
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also argues that racially discriminatory schools do not qualify as "char-
itable" organizations because they violate the clear policy against racial
discrimination 7 embodied in the thirteenth,'" fourteenth,' 9 and
fifteenth2° amendments, and in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.2t Part I of this Note examines the constitutional
significance of the church in politics and the first amendment as a pos-
sible limitation on the Internal Revenue Code's political activity re-
strictions.22 Part II examines the Code restrictions on political activity
by exempt organizations,23 and evaluates the appropriateness of these
restrictions as a means of regulation. 24 Finally, Part III examines the
growing controversy over the IRS policy on racially discriminatory pri-
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative
powers of government reach actions only and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Reply to the Danbury Baptist Ass'n, quoted in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961)
(emphasis added). See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). See generally L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 119-121 (1953).
16. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) ("the First
Amendment has created a wall of separation between Church and State which must be kept high
and impregnable"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State.' "); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Jefferson's letter).
17. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. See Status Hearings (Ft. 1), supra note 6, at 3 (state-
ment of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue); id at 370-71 (statement of Professor
Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School); infra notes 219-83 and accompanying text. See also
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.D.C.), afdmem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1970) (per curiam), appeal
dismissedfor want ofjurisdiction sub nor. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII. Section 1 of the thirteenth amendment provides that:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." Id § 1. Section 2 grants Congress the power to enforce § 1. Id § 2. See also Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id § 1.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV. The fifteenth amendment prohibits the denial of the right to
vote on the basis of race. Id § 1. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Brown held that racial segregation in public schools
was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Id at 495.
22. See infra notes 26-130 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 131-207 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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vate schools and evaluates recent political and legislative developments
challenging its authority to enforce that policy. 25
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of religion is a fundamental right guaranteed by the first
amendment, which prohibits Congress from passing any law "respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... "26 The Supreme Court has attempted to "find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other."27 Although government 28 may neither
establish nor interfere with religion, restraints on first amendment
rights are permitted if the government advances an interest of such vi-
tal importance29 that the restraints are justified.3" Nevertheless, consti-
tutional limitations on church-state relations, derived from the first
amendment, continue to be a source of conflict.3t Denial of tax exemp-
tions as a means of regulating church political activity32 and private
school admissions policies33 has been vehemently attacked as violative
of both the establishment and free exercise clauses.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHURCH
IN POLITICS
Opposition to politically active religious groups34 is premised on an
25. See infra notes 213-326 and accompanying text.
26. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
27. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
28. The first amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (free exercise clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(same). Cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights cannot include the incorporation of the
establishment clause because no individual right is involved). See generally N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1176 n.2 (1976).
29. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
30. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971).
31. See infra notes 61-130 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 131-212 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 213-326 and accompanying text.
34. Attempts by some states to bar the clergy from holding political office represent early
opposition to the involvement of religion in secular government. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 15,
at 193-95. When the United States Constitution was adopted, 13 state constitutions contained
provisions barring clergymen from holding office. During the nineteenth century, all but two
Number 2]
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historical view of religion as limited to the spiritual life of the individ-
ual.35 The involvement of religious organizations in the political pro-
states, Tennessee and Maryland, discontinued the clergy-disqualification provisions. TENN.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; MD. CONST. art. III, § 11. See 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 622 (1950); L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 193-94.
In 1974, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland held the Maryland provi-
sion prohibiting the clergy from holding office in the state legislature unconstitutional. The court
rejected the state's argument that such a provision insured separation of church and state, and
held that the restriction violated the first amendment free exercise clause as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D. Md. 1974).
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that the provision of the Tennessee constitution disqualifying
ministers from serving as legislators violated the first amendment free exercise clause. The Court
found that the provision conditioned a minister's right to exercise his religion on the surrendering
of his right to hold political office. The Court stated that "the American experience provides no
persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-establish-
ment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts."
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (footnote omitted).
During the pre-Civil War years, there were frequent violent outbursts against the participation
of churches and clergy in the antislavery movement. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
Stephen Douglas voiced such opposition when he stated:
The sovereign right of the people to manage their own affairs, in conformity with the
Constitution of their own making, recedes and disappears when placed in subordination
to the authority of a body of men, claiming, by virtue of their offices as ministers, to be a
divinely-appointed institution for the declaration and enforcement of God's will upon
earth.
L. EVERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING IN THE NATION'S CAPITOL 6 (1951). See generally L. RICH-
ARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING": ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN
AMERICA (1970).
The Catholic Church continues to face vehement opposition to its extensive political activity
against abortion. In 1977, the National Association of Women Religious, an organization of
Catholic nuns, argued that Catholic Church efforts to pass a constitutional amendment banning
abortion would result in an "imposition of one [moral] view on the rest of society." See F. JAFFE,
B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 74 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ABORTION POLITICS].
See also Abortion-Part 1 Hearings Before the Subcommr on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 624 (1974) [hereinafter cited asAbortion-Part
1]. The following statement by Roman Catholics for the Right to Choose supports this concern:
We are all Catholics, and many of us are totally opposed to abortion for ourselves.
But we feel very strongly that we have no moral right to make this decision for others.
This Subcommittee will hear much testimony from representatives of our church.
They will speak with deep conviction about the sanctity of the pre-viable fetus. But we
believe they will neglect some of the equally important consequences of fusing our par-
ticular scale of values as the basis for secular law.
Id
35. Jefferson's Notes on Religion sets forth the proposition that religion's primary concern is
with the relationship between "man and his God." See L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 94.
The clergy-disqualification provision in the first New York constitution reflects this premise:
And whereas the ministers of the gospel are by their profession, dedicated to the service
of God and the care of souls, and ought not to be delivered from the great duties of their
function; therefore, no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatsoever,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/6
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cess, however, has long been a reality in American society.3 6
Moreover, the last several decades have witnessed a more expansive
involvement by religious and quasi-religious 37 organizations in poli-
tics.38 The Roman Catholic Church's active opposition 39 to the liberal-
shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence or deception whatever, be eligible to, or
capable of holding any civil or military office or place within this State.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIX.
36. See infra note 46. See generally M. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION 249 (1968); R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-7 (1963); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866-67 (1978).
37, A quasi-religious organization might be characterized as having a basically religious per-
spective with a stated, or actual, secular purpose of active participation in politics. If its operation
revolves substantial political activity, it is considered an "action" organization under the Internal
Revenue Code and disqualified from exemption as a religious, charitable or scientific organiza-
tion. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). The determination of whether an organization is an action organi-
zation must be made in light of all its activities, the surrounding circumstances, and the articles of
organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv) (1954). The following cases involved organiza-
tions denied exemption because of substantial political activity: Haswell v. United States, 500
F 2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1107 (1975); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc.
v. Umted States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). See Rev. Rul.
74-117, 1974-1 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185; Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125. But
see Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-47 I.R.B. 11; Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138. See also infra notes
143-68 and accompanying text.
38. Twenty-eight states liberalized existing criminal abortion laws prior to the Supreme
Court decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Most of the reformed laws were based on the American Law Institute's proposed model law. The
proposed law suggested legalizing abortion: (1) for purposes of saving the mother's life; (2) for
avoiding "serious impairment of the mother's health (including mental health)"; (3) when preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest; and (4) when there was a strong possibility that the fetus was
defective. See J. SALTMAN & S. ZIMERING, ABORTION TODAY 76-81 (1973).
The 1967 proposed legislation in Arizona is representative of reform efforts prior to Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton:
Therapeutic abortion may be performed in a licensed hospital by a duly licensed physi-
cian, only upon approval of a therapeutic abortion committee of the hospital appointed
by the hospital, for those patients who seek it when one of the following conditions
exist(s):
1. There is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair
the physical or mental health of the mother.
2. There is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defect.
3. The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.
D. O'NEIL, CHURCH LOBBYING IN A WESTERN STATE 26 (1970). For an analysis of the Catholic
Church's lobbying efforts in opposition to the liberalization of the Arizona criminal abortion stat-
ute, see D. O'NEIL, supra, at 32-44. For a general discussion of the political activity involved in
reform legislation, see J. SALTMAN & S. ZIMERING, supra, at 69-81. For a discussion of the polit-
ical process involved in reforming Hawaii's criminal abortion statute, see P. STEINHOF & M. DIA-
MOND, ABORTION POLITICS (1977).
39. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 201-02. See also infra notes 39-60 and accompanying
text.
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ization of state abortion legislation;40 its efforts to ban abortion by
amending the Constitution,41 especially in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade42 and Doe v. Bolton ;43 and its massive
40. See ABORTION POLITICS, supra note 34. The Bishop's Committee for Pro-Life Activities
was established in 1972 in response to the liberalization of state abortion laws. See supra note 40
and accompanying text. Its principal goal was to inform the public of the Catholic Church's
antiabortion stance, and to organize the political opposition to liberaliziig reform legislation.
ABORTION POLITICS, supra note 34, at 74.
41. See generally I ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 34-57 (R. Hall ed. 1970); ABORTION
POLITICS, supra note 34, at 87-94; D. O'NEIL, supra note 38, at 27-31. The Catholic Church posi-
tion is that there can be no justification for the termination of an unborn fetus. The moral basis
for this view is that human life is sacred; that it exists before birth; and that abortion violates the
legal and moral prohibition against killing. Although the Church at one time imposed a more
lenient penalty for abortion of an "unformed" fetus-one that is without a soul-it now refuses to
recognize any penalty less than excommunication for the woman undergoing the abortion and for
the person performing it. The only possible exception is for an unintended abortion resulting
from attempts to save a woman's life. See D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION (1970); Noonan, Abortion
and the Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12 NAT. L.F. 85 (1967); Tribe, Foreword- Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Declaration on.4bortion states that "[t]he child in
the womb is human. Abortion is an unjust destruction of a human life and morally that is mur-
der." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DECLARATION ON ABORTION (1974), re-
printed in Abortion-Part I, supra note 34, at 181. See also O'Donnell, Abortion, I1 (Moral
Aspects), in I NEw CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 28 (1967) ("The moral malice of abortion is found
simply in the fact that it is a directly intended and totally indefensible destruction of innocent
human life."). The Second Vatican Council stated the Catholic Church view of "abortion and
infanticide [as] unspeakable crimes." See 1 ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra.
The National Committee for a Human Life Amendment was established shortly after the
Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. Its goal as a lobbying group is to
effect the passage of a constitutional amendment giving an unborn fetus legal rights from the time
of conception. See Abortion-Part , supra note 34. Of four proposed amendments, none were
reported out of subcommittee. In explaining the failure of the amended proposals, Senator Bayh,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, stated:
The simple and irrefutable fact is that [abortion] is not an issue that can be properly or
effectively dealt with in a constitutional context.
. . . By amending the Constitution to establish one view as to when life begins at a
time when there is no clear agreement among various religious denominations or among
people in general, appears to me to be a serious misreading of the nature of the Constitu-
tion itself.
... It is precisely in areas that are so intimate, where public attitudes are deeply
divided, both morally and religiously, that private choice can be defended as our Consti-
tution's way of reconciling the irreconcilable without dangerously embroiling church and
state in one another's affairs.
121 CONG. REC. 29,057 (1975).
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held thai a Texas criminal abortion statute was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated a woman's right to privacy under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Id at 153. Although the state has important interests in regulat-
ing abortion, it may not regulate during the first trimester of pregnancy. The state has no compel-
ling interest in interfering with a physician-patient decision during this period. Id at 163.
The state's interest in regulation begins with the second trimester of pregnancy, to the extent
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lobbying and campaign activity,' indicate the reality of the church as a
that it "reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Id The state's
interest becomes compelling at the point of viability, and can go so far as to prohibit abortion,
except when the life or health of the woman is endangered. The woman's right to have an abor-
tion, therefore, is not absolute. Id at 163-64.
43. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In the companion case to Roe v. Wade, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a Georgia statute requiring abortions to be performed only in privately accredited hospitals,
after approval by the hospital staff abortion committee, and after confirmation by two licensed
and independent physicians. Id at 195, 199-200. The Court outlined the responsibilities of the
physician when a woman requests an abortion as follows:
ITihe medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.
All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he
needs to make his best medical judgment.
Id at 193.
44. In 1975 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops endorsed a detailed analysis of the
political action necessary to pass an antiabortion amendment and enact restrictive state and fed-
eral abortion legislation. See ABORTION POLITICS, supra note 34, at 73-80. This analysis called
for extensive grass roots lobbying activity, as well as a national political movement to effect pas-
sage of a constitutional amendment. It also emphasized that "the task of [the] church-fostered
pro-life groups is essentially political, that is, to organize people to help persuade the elected
representatives.. . [to] pass... a constitutional amendment." See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PASTORAL PLAN FOR PRO-LIFE AcTIvrritEs (1975), quotedin ABORTION POLI-
TICS, supra note 34, at 75.
The National Right to Life Committee, while disclaiming affiliation with the Catholic Church,
has its roots in the Catholic antiabortion movement. It functions primarily as an umbrella group
for the many local Right to Life organizations. Its objective is to pass a human life amendment.
The group has recently come into conflict with the hierarchy of the Cathotic Church because of its
increasing identification with Christian fundamentalist political lobbying organizations. It estab-
lished the Life Amendment Political Action Committee (LAPAC) to defeat moderate Congress-
men in the 1980 election campaigns who opposed the proposed amendment. See ABORTION
POLITICS, supra note 34, at 121-22.
Repeated unsuccessful efforts to amend the Constitution caused the National Right to Life
Committee to call for a constitutional convention. The Constitution provides, in article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). The calling of a convention to amend the Constitution has
never been used, ostensibly because two thirds of the states have never agreed to do so. For a
discussion of the difficulties involved in the constitutional convention approach, see Note, Pro-
posed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 1612 (1972). See also Gilliam, Constitutional Convention: Precedents, Problens, and Pro-
posals, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 46 (1971).
Substantial concern has been expressed about holding a constitutional convention, primarily
because no statutory procedures or standards exist that would govern the convention. Further, it
is unclear whether, once the convention is called, it could be limited to the single proposed amend-
ment. See Proceduresfor Calling Constitutional Conventions Upon Application by States: Hearings
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"constant presence"45 in politics. In addition, the emergence 46 of
on S2307 Before the Subcomm on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-63 (1967) (statement of Alexander M. Bickel). See generally Black, The
Proposed Amendmentof Article V" A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957 (1963); Bonfield,
Proposing ConstitutionalAmendments by Convention: Some Problems, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 659
(1964); Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of ConstitutionalAmendment, 26 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 185 (1951); Feerick, Amending the Constitution Through a Convention, 60 A.B.A.J. 285
(1974). See also Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621 (1965); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939);
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Hawke v. Smith, 253
U.S. 221 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1878).
The Catholic hierarchy opposes calling a constitutional convention to amend the Constitution.
See ABORTION POLITICS, supra note 34, at 120.
The abortion issue became particularly controversial in the 1980 presidential campaign after
Archbishop Humberto Cardinal Medeiros of Boston sent a letter on church stationery to all Mas-
sachusetts Catholic congregations. The letter stated that elected officials responsible for legalizing
abortion, and those who elected them, "cannot separate themselves totally from that guilt which
accompanies this horrendous crime and deadly sin. If you are for true freedom ... you will vote
to save 'our children, born and unborn."' Lewis,Religion andPolitics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1980,
§ A, at 31, col. 2. The criticism resulting from this letter pushed abortion to the forefront of
election issues. See The Archbishop andAbortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1980, § A, at 26, col. 1.
The Catholic hierarchy remained firm in its opposition to abortion, but retreated from the position
that a candidate's stand on the issue should be the determinative voting criterion. See ADMINIS-
TRATIVE BOARD, U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHOICES FOR THE
1980s, reprinted in 9 ORIGINS 349 (1979).
45. L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 202. See also infra note 46. The effectiveness of the Catho-
lic Church's national lobbying power is evident from the following description:
Every time the Senate conferees make a compromise offer, Mr. Gallagher [lobbyist for
the National Committee for a Human Life Amendment] quietly walks to the conference
table to tell a staff aide to the 11 House conferees whether the proposal is acceptable to
the bishops. His recommendations invariably are followed.
Tolchin, On Abortion, the Houses Still Remain Miles Apart, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1977, § 4, at 4,
col. 3.
46. Professor Pfeffer has discerned three principal patterns of church involvement in politics:
(I) the church responds to what it considers a moral deficiency in society, but in a relatively
disorganized manner, (2) the church again responds to a single moral issue, but in an organized
and well-planned effort; and (3) the church responds to a single moral issue, but is permanently
involved in politics in the sense that it is prepared to act whenever it feels called upon to do so.
See L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 201-02. The first two historical patterns of church political
activity have evolved into a far more expansive involvement, represented most recently by the
Catholic response to the abortion issue, an example of Pfeffer's third category. See supra note 38-
45 and accompanying text. The phenomenon of Christian fundamentalist political activity, which
has emerged since Pfeffer developed his categories, adds support to his view of the church as a
"constant presence" in politics. Current political activity by religious organizations and the con-
cern with maintaining separation must, however, be viewed in the context of historical involve-
ment by churches in politics. It is clear that although the intensity with which these groups have
become involved is not unprecedented, the broad scope of involvement is a relatively recent devel-
opment.
The antislavery movement provides an early example of the first pattern of involvement by the
church in political action for social change. In 1688, a group of Pennsylvania Quakers formally
condemned the practice of slaveholding. The Quakers' moral condemnation was based on the
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view that the grace of God elevated all men, regardless of color, to a common level of equality.
To hold slaves was, in addition, incongruous with the freedom the Quakers had sought and gained
by immigrating to America. The first formal denunciation of slavery was, however, unsuccessful
in its attempt to persuade other Quakers to free their slaves. See generally T. DRAKE, QUAKERS
AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA (1950); J. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS (1976).
During the years prior to the American Revolution, a substantial increase in opposition to slav-
ery took place, most notably among the Quakers, Baptists and Methodists. See generally D. Du-
MOND, ANTISLAVERY 26-34 (1961); S. JAMES, A PEOPLE AMONG PEOPLES 268-334 (1963); D.
MATTHEWS, SLAVERY AND METHODISM 3-29 (1965); W. POOLE, ANTI-SLAVERY OPINIONS BEFORE
THE YEAR 1800, at 43-58 (1873). Slavery came to be viewed as a complete contradiction to the
goals and underlying principles of the American Revolution. Thus, Madison, Hamilton, Paine,
Franklin, and Jefferson advocated emancipation. By 1804, every Northern state had passed
emancipation laws. For a collection of the views on slavery held by prominent figures in the
American Revolution, see G. LivERMoRE, AN HISTORICAL RESEARCH RESPECTING THE OPIN-
IONS OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC ON NEGROES AS SLAVES, AS CITIZENS, AND AS
SOLDIERS (1862). See generally M. DILLON, THE ABOLITIONISTS (1974); D. MACLEOD, SLAVERY,
RACE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1974); D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820 (1971).
The church's active participation in the anti-slavery movement did not end with the start of the
Civil War. See generally 2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 246 (1950)
(religious activity during the Reconstruction period).
The movement's most active participants viewed the struggle as a reaffirmation of their Chris-
tian identity. See generally B. THOMAS, THEODORE WELD (1950). Abolitionists during the nine-
teenth century viewed the movement as an attempt to reconcile and redeem all mankind through
Christian brotherhood. "In slaveholding [the abolitionists] discovered the ultimate source of the
moral collapse which so deeply disturbed them." J. STEWART, supra, at 48. The spokesmen of the
movement grounded their activism on principles derived from the Bible. See, e.g., A. BARNES,
THE CHURCH AND SLAVERY 42 (1857) ("the spin! of the New Testament is against slavery, and the
principles of the New Testament, if fairly applied, would abolish it."); G. CHEEVER, GOD
AGAINST SLAVERY 93 (1857) ("That the system of slavery is sinful in the sight of God, is capable
of demonstration by several distinct lines of proof."); D. CHRISTY, PULPIT POLITICS 78 (1862)
("The horrors of slavery ... , and the public mind awakened to its moral turpitude, the future
mode of action was to show that, being a heinous sin, slaveholding ought not to be connived at in
the church.").
William Lloyd Garrison, founder of the American Anti-Slavery Society, wrote in the Society's
"Declaration of Sentiments":
[T]hose laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are therefore, before
God, utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine prerogative, a
daring infringement on the law of nature, a base overthrow of the very foundations of
the social compact ... and a presumptuous transgression of all the holy command-
ments ....
See R. WALLCUT, SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRI-
SON 68-69 (1968). See also R. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE HUMANITARIAN RE-
FORMERS (1955).
The American Anti-Slavery Society was first organized in Boston in 1832, and had its first
national convention in 1833. The convention members were Quakers, Evangelicals, Congrega-
tionalists, and Unitarians. The platform adopted included a demand for immediate and uncondi-
tional emancipation. The more conservative abolitionists claimed that the American public was
not prepared for immediate emancipation, and favored a gradual process. Nevertheless, the Soci-
ety became the source of the politicization of the antislavery movement, and within three years
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had established 500 local antislavery societies. The massive petition drives organized by the Soci-
ety, intended to "disrupt" national politics and raise antislavery as a political issue in Washington,
were so successful that in 1836 the House of Representatives passed the famous gag rule prohibit-
ing floor debate on antislavery petitions. See generally R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM (1964);
Bretz, The Economic Background of the Liberty Party, in 34 Am. HIST. REV. 250 (1929). The gag
rule provided the abolitionists with further support in their struggle against the antiabolitionist
Northern Democrats and Whigs. The Society argued that the gag rule was an indication of con-
gressional willingness to infringe constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of speech, freedom
of the press and freedom to petition. See generally S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE
UNION (1956); McPherson, The Fight Against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt andAntislavery Insur-
gency in the Whig Party, 1839-1842, 48 3. NEGRO HIsT. 177 (1963).
The transformation of the movement into a political pressure group did not, however, diminish
the moral and religious principles underlying the opposition to slavery. It remained a religious
movement, and the eventual split in the Society was based on political strategy, not on religious
principles. See generally T. DRAKE, supra, at 133-66; 3. STEWART, supra, at 50-96.
The second of Professor Pfeffer's patterns of church involvement in politics is illustrated by the
prohibition movement, the early success of which was the result of a highly organized church
lobbying effort. The Anti-Saloon League developed out of a mass meeting of the Oberlin Tem-
perance Alliance in 1874. Archbishop John Ireland and Rev. A.J. Kynett, chairman of the Perma-
nent Committee on Prohibition and Temperance of the Methodist Church, began the movement
for a national league in 1894. It was formed and organized at a national convention in Washing-
ton, D.C. A majority of the delegates to the first convention were clergy, and practically all of the
officers were religious leaders. See H. ASBURY, supra note 34, at 96-100. See generally P. ODE-
GARD, PRESSURE POLITICS (1928).
The Anti-Saloon League claimed to be the "Church in action against the saloon." It came to be
known as the "real agency through which the church was directing its fight against the liquor
traffic." E. CHERRINGTON, HISTORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE (1913), quotedin H. ASBURY,
supra note 34, at 96. It coordinated and centralized the local church temperance groups. See D.
COLVIN, supra note 34, at 380-406; 3. TIMBERLAKE, PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MENT, 1900-1920, at 125-49 (1963). The League was attacked for being a religious political organ-
ization, but refused to deny its political purposes and methods. On the contrary, it boasted of
being the most effective political organization in the world after the eighteenth amendment was
ratified. H. ASBURY, supra note 34, at 100-01, 127-37; D. COLVIN, supra note 34, at 380-85. See
also L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 200. The League was successful in passing prohibition laws in
33 states, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia prior to ratification of the eighteenth
amendment. Through the League's lobbying efforts, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act over
the veto of President Taft. The Act, although limited in its effect, gave the states, rather than the
federal government, control over laws governing interstate commerce in alcohol. Cf. Clark Distil-
ling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Webb-Kenyon Act).
In the 1914 elections, the League was responsible for gaining nearly a two-thirds majority of
prohibitionists in the House of Representatives. When the eighteenth amendment was passed by
the House in 1917, there was a six year limitation for ratification. Bishop Cannon, Jr., then chair-
man of the League's National Legislative Committee, stated that the amendment would be ratified
within two years. In fact, it took only 13 months to ratify. Cf. Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S.
350 (1920) (upholding the constitutionality of the eighteenth amendment).
The League was largely responsible for inducing Congress to pass the National Prohibition Act
(the Volstead Act) over the veto of President Wilson. Cf. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264
(1921) (upholding the constitutionality of the Volstead Act). See generally D. COLVIN, supra note
34, at 430-51; J. TIMBERLAKE, supra, at 149-84. Although unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent
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Christian fundamentalist groups47 in the political arena departs signifi-
cantly from historical patterns of church political activity.48 The activi-
ties of these groups49 often take the form of partisan support of political
candidates based on a defined ideology and agenda." The confluence
of religious goals and the political acumen of fundamentalist or-
ganizers5' has developed into a highly effective lobbying and campaign
repeal of the prohibition amendment, see H. ASBURY, supra note 34, at 141-323, the League coor-
dinated a highly organized, nonpartisan, single issue campaign for social reform. L. PFEFFER,
supra note 15, at 202.
47. Historically, fundamentalists have viewed their task as divorced from political involve-
ment. Religion was viewed as a private matter of the individual, separate and distinct from the
world of politics. Involvement in politics occurred only when issues central to religion were at
stake. Thus, fundamentalists were active in opposing the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution
in the schools and legislative and judicial restrictions on prayer in the schools. See Wood, Reli-
gious Fundamentalism and the New Right, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 409, 417 (1980).
48. Three important Christian fundamentalist organizations emerged in 1979. The Religious
Roundtable, Moral Majority, and Christian Voice were organized to mobilize Christians into an
effective political movement. See Wood, supra note 47, at 413-17; Born-Again Politics, supra note
8, at 31-36.
49. Unlike church political activity in the prohibition, antislavery and antiabortion move-
ments, Christian fundamentalist political activity has not developed as a response to a single,
compelling issue. Christian fundamentalist organizations during the 1980 election campaign out-
lined a general political agenda opposing abortion, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment,
school busing, pornography, the strategic arms limitation treaty, rights of homosexuals, and sex
education in the schools. Further, they actively supported prayer in public schools, the teaching of
creationism, capital punishment, community censorship of textbooks, and a stronger national de-
fense. The organizations openly endorsed specific candidates, and were distinctly partisan in their
efforts to defeat targeted officeholders. Christian Voice rated all members of Congress on the
.'morality" of their voting records. Moral Majority recruited and trained individuals to run for
political office on a "pro-God, pro-family" platform. See Chandler, The New Religious Right:
Worshiping a Past 7hat Never Was, 42 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 20 (1982); Wood, supra note 47, at
413-17; Born-Again Politics, supra note 8, at 28-36.
50. One commentator stated that the political activity of fundamentalist organizations is in
marked contrast to the tradition of mainline religious denominations-Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Jewish-which have, by and large, generally seen their role in the political
process to be one of advocacy of ideas in the formulation of public policy and not the
advancement of partisan politics or the election of particular candidates.
Wood, supra note 47, at 418.
51. Political organizations closely linked to the fundamentalists' activity include the Con-
servative Caucus, the Heritage Foundation, the American Conservative Union, and the National
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC). The most influential and powerful of the
fundamentalist leaders are Jerry Falwell, co-founder of Moral Majority and a television evangelist
who claims a viewing audience of 25 million people; Pat Robertson, co-founder of Moral Majority
and president of his own religious television network; and James Robison, co-founder of the Reli-
gious Roundtable and a television evangelist who co-sponsored and assembled 18,000 people for a
"public affairs briefing" for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. The political counterparts to
the fundamentalist religious leaders include Paul Weyrich, a veteran political organizer and head
of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and a Washington-based candidate training
school; Howard Phillips, head of the lobbying organization, Conservative Caucus, and co-founder
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effort functioning on local, state and national levels.5 The goal of this
effort is to defeat candidates5 3 and change policies54 that are inconsis-
tent with perceived "moral absolutes.""5  The recent divergence of
political activity by religious organizations from historical patterns of
involvement has been challenged as incompatible with the principles
underlying the first amendment.5 6  Commentators are primarily con-
cerned with perceived attempts by fundamentalists to "Christianize the
government." '57 They argue that by ignoring the pluralism guaranteed
of Moral Majority, John Dolan, head of NCPAC, an organization claiming responsibility for the
defeat of Senators Bayh, McGovern, and Church in the 1980 elections; Edward McAteer, co-
founder of the Religious Roundtable and formerly associated with the Conservative Caucus; and
Richard Viguerie, a direct mail expert largely responsible for successful fund-raising programs for
the religious organizations. See Chandler, supra note 49, at 24; Born-Again Politics, supra note 8,
at 31. For a detailed discussion of the organizations and leadership involved in the "new religious
right," see P. SHRIVER, THE BIBLE VoTE 5-41 (1981).
52. In Alaska, for example, fundamentalists succeeded in efforts to control state and local
party organizations and thereafter nominated their own candidates for political office. Herbers,
Ultraconservative EvangelicalsA4 Surging New Force in Politics, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1980, § 1, at
1, col. 3. In Florida, a fundamentalist minister who succeeded in getting the members of his
church to take over the local Democratic committee said: "We're running for everything from
dogcatcher to senator." Born-Again Politics, supra note 8, at 29.
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
55. Wood, supra note 47, at 418. One commentator stated that "[t]he ethic of the new reli-
gious right is not an ethic of moral struggle and decision but of divine command and human
obedience or disobedience." Thomas, The New Religious Right: Worshiping a Place That Isn't
God, 42 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 26 (1982).
56. Patricia Harris, as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, stated
that the increased political activism of fundamentalist religious groups was:
At best exclusionary and at worst a dangerous, intolerant and polarizing influence in our
political system. Our democracy has functioned because, as a rule, we have sought out
common ground, shared values and beliefs, rather than an orthodoxy espoused by any
particular group. That consensus orientation is profoundly threatened by those who ad-
vocate a "Christian Crusade" or want our leadership narrowed to include only "pro-
Christian" public officials.
Fundamentalists'A1ctiviy in Politics Called a Danger, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, § B, at 10, col. 6.
Ira Glasser, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, called the increasing involvement
of Christian fundamentalist groups in the political process "an exceptional threat" to civil rights
and liberties. Threat to Civil Liberties Seen, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1980, § A, at 17, col. 2.
The National Association of Evangelicals, a conservative Christian organization which reflects
the traditional fundamentalist view in its distrust of political involvement, see supra note 47, criti-
cized the new fundamentalist groups' claim that certain political views are the only ones authenti-
cated by the Bible. The organization viewed the result of such a claim as an attempt to form a
quasi-political Christian party. Briggs, Evangelicals Debate Their Role in Battling Secularism,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981, § A, at 12, col. 4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
57. See Religious Rally on Mall in the Capital Draws Support and Criticism, N.Y. Times, April
27, 1980, § 1, at 64, col. 3. The phrase came from a statement issued by 20 religious organizations
denouncing a "Washington for Jesus" rally organized by fundamentalists in 1980. A spokesman
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by the Constitution,58 religious organizations threaten to impose a par-
ticular view of morality on society.5 9 These attempts, in turn, threaten
the first amendment's mandate of separation of church and state.60
for the National Council of Churches called the rally an "arrogant" attempt to insist that one
group's position on a political issue is Christian while all others are not. Id See also Thomas,
supra note 55, at 28:
The spirit of the new religious right is one of a "heteronomous" reaction to a spiritu-
ally indifferent "autonomous" culture. Secular humanism is its true enemy and foil, and
a divinely commanded order of social and personal life is its chief weapon. Where au-
tonomous values are relativistic, heteronomy brings back normative absolutism. Where
autonomy relies upon the creativity of reason, heteronomy demands that reason be
subordinated to primal revelation. Where the autonomous consciousness subjects all
things to objective investigation, heteronomy protects its sacred forms from rational in-
quiry.
... The heteronomy of the new religious right is not just an overzealous commitment
to morality; it is an attack on human freedom and responsibility.
id
58. See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTTUTION 80-86 (1964); L. PFEFFER,
supra note 15, at 192.
59. Professor Kauper warned of the resulting dangers if one group attempts to impose its
moral view on society:
It is not the business of the churches ... to seek to make a Christian state out of the
nation or to Christianize the law. State, government, and law are necessarily secular in
character .... Churches transgress their proper function when they attempt to impose
their own peculiar moral beliefs derived from religious insight upon others who do not
share these beliefs and insights. It is imperative that in our pluralistic society no church
seek the sanction of law for its own moral conception unless they are translatable into
moral values and social policy appropriate to the purposes of the secular community.
T he notion that churches must stay out of politics is valid only insofar as it ex-
presses the idea that the church must not identify itself with the state, use its influence as
a political force to control the action of government, or use the force of numbers to
impose its moral views on the community.
P. KAUPER, supra note 58, at 83-84 (emphasis added).
60. As one commentator has noted:
The current resurgence of religious fervor belies Justice Powell's confident assertion
that religious extremism no longer poses any threat to our democratic institutions. Re-
cent alliances between fundamentalist religious factions and right wing political groups
may be interpreted as just such a threat. The danger does not lie in the participation of
these factions in the political process, but rather in their use of the political process to
further their own group's beliefs and practices.
Note, Rebuilding the Wall- The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (1981) (referring to Justice Powell's concurring and dis-
senting opinion in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977)) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Tribe stated that the country's "civil peace" is endangered if religious factions develop
an intolerance of each other. Briggs, Debate is Growing on Legalities of Religious Activism, N.Y.
Times. Oct. 3, 1980, § A, at 22, col. 1. See also L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 192.
Another commentator, addressing the emergence of fundamentalism in politics, stated:
[In the fundamentalist's] reaction to a secular and morally permissive society. . . there
are specific cultural and religious forms which are the direct will of God, and to question
them is to rebel against Deity.
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The Supreme Court's analysis of the first amendment religion
clauses frequently begins with an inquiry into the framers' intentions.6"
The significance of historical intent lies in the "human values"62 that
served as the underpinnings of the religion clauses. 63 The Court has
[Fundamentalist politics] represents not just a violation of pluralism but a purging of the
heart and core of the Christian faith.... [While such a religious form has a legitimate
claim to a certain truth and power, it is a force which can only be destructive in its
realization.
Thomas, supra note 55, at 29.
61. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,700-16 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-14 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424-30 (1960);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459-543 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214-16, 244-48 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion; Reed, J., dissenting);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 121-
28 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878). For a
discussion of the Court's interpretation of historical evidence in deciding first amendment cases,
see P. KAUPER, supra note 58, at 45-53; L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 109-14; Kauper, Everson v.
Board of Education: .4 Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARtz. L. REV. 307, 317-19 (1973). See
generally M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978).
For critical analyses of the Court's interpretation of constitutional history, see C. ANTiEAU, A.
DOWNEY, & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 140 (1964); M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965); W. KATz, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONS 9 (1964); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 3 (1949); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation,
31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964).
Professor Tribe has identified three principal views on the meaning of the religion clauses which
were debated during the framing of the Constitution. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 816-17. The
"evangelical view," developed by Roger Williams of Rhode Island, required separation of church
and state for the protection of the churches from government interference. Id at 816. The "Jef-
fersonian view" was that separation was required for the protection of the state from church inter-
ference. "[lit was Jefferson's conviction that only the complete separation of religion from politics
would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among
political views." Id at 817. Finally, the "Madisonian view" was that both religion and govern-
ment needed and benefited from complete noninterference from the other. Id See generally R.
ERNST, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ROGER WILLIAMS (1929); R. MORGAN & J. EDMUND,
ROGER WILLIAMS, THE CHURCH AND THE STATE (1967); sources cited infra notes 62-64.
62. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 816. Another commentator has stated:
[A]ttempts to resolve twentieth century church-state problems by asking ourselves how
the entire pantheon of the founding fathers would have resolved them will prove fu-
tile ....
... [Tihe proper objective of an historical search should be the determination of the
"historic purpose of the First Amendment." In other words, the Court, in giving content
to the first amendment should attempt to incorporate the human purposes and values
underlying it.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Developments, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1383-84 (1967) (quoting Jones, Church-State Relations: Our Constitutional Heritage, in
RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 156, 173 (H. Stahmer ed. 1963)). See also Summers,
The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53, 55-58 (1946).
63. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
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frequently focused on Madison's' and Jefferson's65 views that a strict
separation of church and state must be maintained.66 Maintaining strict
separation, however, has not been a consistently applied priority, espe-
cially in recent years.67 The immediate concern, however, is the extent
to which Madison and Jefferson envisioned separation as entailing ex-
clusion of religion from politics. The Court's interpretation of the his-
torical values68 supports its position that separation does not require
churches or the clergy to stand apart from politics.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,69 the Court held that churches have the
right to take positions on political issues, including the "vigorous advo-
cacy of legal or constitutional positions."70 The Court in McDaniel v.
Paty7t stated that although one purpose of the establishment clause is
prevention of political divisiveness along religious lines, this purpose
does not imply that religious political participation has a less preferred
status than political participation in general.72 Thus, the extent to
ring) ("too literal [a] quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers [is] misdirected. . . [because]
the historical record is at best ambiguous .. "). See also R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND RELIGION 186 (1972); Giannella, supra note 62, at 1383-84.
[Tihe establishment clause embodies a concept of church and state which takes on pre-
cise meaning only in light of prevailing assumptions as to the appropriate sphere of
action for each institution.
. . . As the social, political, and economic milieu evolves, so must the content given
the first amendment.
Id
64. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) ("the leading architect of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) ("[i]n the documents of the times, particularly of Madison .... is to be found
irrefutable confirmation of the Amendment's sweeping content"). But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 684 n.5 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (views of Madison and Jefferson not repre-
sentative of other authors of the amendment); 2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 546-48 (1950) (no evidence that final wording of the amendment was more the result of
Madison's efforts than others).
65. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
66. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. See generall N. DORSEN, P. BENDER &
B. NEUBORNE, supra note 26, at 1170 nn.2-4; M. HowE, supra note 61.
67. For an excellent analysis of the need to return to a strictly neutral separation of church
and state, see Note, supra note 60, at 1473 (arguing that "[r]ecent establishment clause decisions
have given little practical guidance to legislatures and lower courts and have not provided a basic
set of consistent, sound philosophical principles with which to justify legal relationships between
church and state.")
68. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.
69. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
70. Id at 670.
71. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
72. Id at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also P. KAUPER, supra note 58, at 84-85; L.
PEEFFER, supra note 15, at 192; L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 866.
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which religious political activity results in divisiveness must be bal-
anced against the churches' right to engage in political activity.
In a society that values religious pluralism, 73 attempts by any reli-
gion to impose its own moral values on the rest of society threaten to
create political divisiveness along religious lines. 7a A church's insis-
tence on measuring secular law and candidates for office by their con-
formity to its particular conception of morality75 demands that society
choose one set of values over all others.76 The Supreme Court recog-
nized this danger and incorporated it into its test 77 for establishment
clause cases. 7
8
A. The Establishment Clause
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,79 the Court promulgated a three-part test for
establishment clause analysis: government regulation must have a sec-
ular purpose; 0 its primary effect must "be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion;"'" and its result must not excessively entangle
73. See generaly P. KAUPER, supra note 58, at 3-12, 82; M. MARTY, THE NEW SHAPE OF
AMERICAN RELIGION 1-5 (1959); L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 834.
74. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. The increased political activity of funda-
mentalist organizations prompted a challenge from a group of 13 religious denominations. They
argued that fundamentalists' use of morality as a measure of political candidates "represents ideo-
logical preferences rather than the breadth of responsible Christian positions .... There is no
justification in a pluralistic and democratic society for demands for conformity along religious or
ideological lines." Religious Leaders Fault Policies of Evangelical Political Groups, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1980, at B6, col. 1.
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, ex-
pressed a similar concern:
[Jerry Falwell's] exclusivist emphasis on a "Christian Bill of Rights" and a "Christian
America". . . create[s] a divisive climate of opinion hostile to religious tolerance. Such
a climate ... is bad for civil liberties, human rights, social justice, interfaith understand-
ing and mutual respect among Americans.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1980, at A26, col. 4.
75. See P. KAUPER, supra note 58, at 83-85.
76. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
79. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
80. Id at 612. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland
Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,773 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107
(1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
81. 403 U.S. at 612. See, eg., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961).
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government with religion.82 The third element of this test is central to
the discussion of church political activity.
The excessive entanglement test adopts Madison's view that both
religion and government benefit from mutual noninterference.8 3 The
Court in Lemon recognized two aspects of entanglement: administra-
tive entanglement 4 and political divisiveness."5 Administrative entan-
glement refers to the interaction between religion and government on
an institutional level. Avoidance of such entanglement protects reli-
gion from excessive governmental interference.8 6 The second element
of entanglement analysis is designed to protect government from polit-
ical divisiveness along religious lines87 resulting from excessive church
political activity.88
The Court has considered89 striking down legislation on political di-
82. 403 U.S. at 613. See, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761-67
(1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Certain members of the Court have argued that the excessive entanglement aspect of the test is
superfluous because the secular effect limitation is sufficient to prevent excessive entanglement.
See Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 769 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 665-71 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 865.
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. 403 U.S. at 616. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
85. Id at 623.
86. Id at 616. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In his concurring opinion in
Walz, Justice Harlan recognized that most cases can be decided under the administrative entan-
glement aspect of the test, thereby preventing "the most egregious and hence divisive kinds of
state involvement in religious matters." Id at 695.
87. 403 U.S. at 623-24. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
The source of the political divisiveness aspect of the test is Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Walz, 397 U.S. at 695. Justice Harlan stated that "history cautions that political fragmentation
on sectarian lines must be guarded against." Id (citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)). Justice Burger added weight to this observation by stating
in Lemon, that "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect." 403 U.S. at 622. For a sharp criticism of the
Court's use of the political divisiveness test, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious
Lines. The Entanglement ofthe Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J.
205 (1980).
88. 403 U.S. at 623-24. In Lemon, the Court struck down several forms of public funding of
parochial schools in part because of the political divisiveness of such aid. See also Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 & n.15 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
794-98 (1973); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-35 (1960).
89. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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visiveness grounds in two areas:90 first, in the area of public funding of
nonpublic schools, or of their students;9 and second, in the area of
restrictive abortion statutes.92 A finding of political divisiveness, how-
ever, has not been the sole ground for decision in any of these cases.93
The Court is troubled by the possible implications of the test.94 Polit-
ical divisiveness is not sufficient to strike down legislation when the role
of religion is limited to taking a position on political issues and per-
suading others to adopt that position.95 It may be sufficient,96 however,
90. See generally Gaffney, supra note 87, at 225.
91. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 80.
92. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980). See infra notes 101-08 and ac-
companying text.
93. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 868. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 606-22, the Court
relied primarily on administrative entanglement to strike down Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes providing public funds to parochial elementary and secondary schools. Id In Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783-94, the Court struck down a New York statute estab-
lishing financial aid programs for private schools. Although the Court recognized the importance
of the potential political divisiveness of the statute, it relied on the statute's primary effect of
"advanc[ing] religion." Id at 798. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 372, Justice Stewart's opinion
placed equal emphasis on the administrative entanglement and political divisiveness aspects in
striking down one part of a Pennsylvania statute authorizing aid to nonpublic schools. Id One
year later, howdver, the Court in Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. at 766, refused
to strike down a Maryland statute that authorized similar aid to private schools. Although the
nature of the aid program was similar to those struck down in Lemon and Nyquist, the institutions
aided were private colleges as opposed to private elementary or secondary schools. Id Finally, in
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court again relied on the administrative entangle-
ment that would result from an Ohio statute granting aid to parochial schools. Id at 254. Justice
Brennan placed greater emphasis on the potential divisiveness of the program. He stated that
"[the divisive political potential] suffices without more to require the conclusion that the Ohio
statute in its entirety offends the First Amendment's prohibition against laws 'respecting an estab-
lishment of religion.' "Id at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis added).
94. See, eg., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-42 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring):
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may incite,
may foment religious divisiveness and strife does not rob it of constitutional protection.
[G]overnment may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with respect to religion and
fence out from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it regards as over-
involved in religion. Religionists no less than members of any other group enjoy the full
measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity generally.
Id (footnote omitted).
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 867. See also L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 55-63 (1975). Justice Burger supported this conclusion in Waz, 397 U.S. at 670:
Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions
on public issues including ... vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right. No per-
fect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is
an involvement of sorts--one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive
entanglement.
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when religion seeks institutional power or economic benefits.97
The Court in Committeefor Public Education v. Nyquist9s refused to
base its decision solely on the potential political divisiveness of the stat-
ute.99 Nevertheless, it recognized political divisiveness as an important
"warning signal."" 0 In Harris v. McRae,' °' the Court rejected a claim
that the Hyde amendment, which prohibits federal fund reimburse-
ment for abortions under the Medicaid program, 0 2 violated the estab-
lishment clause because it developed from the political activity and
religious tenets of the Catholic Church. 3 The McRae Court con-
fronted an extremely divisive issue,1°4 but refused to find divisiveness
along religious lines dispositive.'05 Rather, the Court held the Hyde
amendment constitutional,"°6 and based its decision on the implicit
guarantee of equal protection in the fifth amendment due process
clause.' 7 The MacRae decision implies that political divisiveness is of
secondary concern to other first amendment rights. Whether the test
will be applied as anything more than a warning signal remains un-
clear.'08 Nevertheless, the Court has not abandoned it as a potential
Id
96. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 867-69.
97. Id Professor Tribe has indicated at least one other basis for triggering the political divi-
siveness test:
However religious may be the wellsprings of the view that murder and mutilation are
wrong... discussions about public policy in this area can readily avoid open confronta-
tion with controverted religious premises. But a controversy may be so structured in a
particular social and historical context that no attempt to resolve it in a public forum can
avoid explicit confrontation with the religious differences that ultimately divide the
disputants....
Tribe, supra note 41, at 23 n.106 (emphasis added).
98. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
99. Id at 783-94. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100. Id at 794.
101. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
102. The Hyde amendment is a rider attached annually to the appropriations bill for the De-
partment of Health and Human Services. The 1980 version provides:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest
when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or
public health service.
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979). See generally 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 247 (1981).
103. 448 U.S. at 319-20.
104. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
105. 448 U.S. at 326.
106. Id at 318-20.
107. See 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 247, 250 (1981).
108. See generally Gaffney, supra note 87, at 224-32.
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basis for decision.109
B. The Free Exercise Clause
Religious organizations have also attacked congressional restrictions
on church political activity as unconstitutional infringements on the
free exercise of religion. 10 The Supreme Court has never decided the
issue." Until it does, elimination, or substantial liberalization, of the
Code restrictions on political activity would pose a direct challenge to
the historical mandate of maintaining separation of church and state.
The Supreme Court's free exercise decisions distinguish governmen-
tal interference with an individual's belief from interference with an
individual's conduct." 2 Interference with religious belief is absolutely
prohibited," 3 whereas religious conduct may be regulated upon a
109. One commentator advocates complete abandonment of the political divisiveness test.
See Gaffney, supra note 87. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 867-69; Tribe, supra note 41, at 23
n.106.
110. See Hearings on H. 13500, supra note 8, at 63-64, 75-76, 90-91 (statements of various
religious leaders on the conflict between free exercise of religion and political activity restrictions).
The following statement is representative of this concern:
Because some churches define their religious missions as including obligations to
speak out on and attempt to influence public affairs, we hold that to do so is a part of
their constitutionally protected religious liberty. The state may not deny or limit that
right. Neither may it require that a church give up its rights to the 'free exercise" of religion
under the First Amendment to be eligible to gain a statutoryprivilege (e.g. tax exemption).
Id at 64 (statement of James E. Wood, Jr.) (emphasis added).
Religious and charitable organizations also attacked the political activity restrictions of section
501(c)(4) of the Code because of the imbalance resulting from allowing businesses and organiza-
tions representing them the right to conduct legislative activity with tax deductible funds under
§ 162(e). Id at 30, 37 (statement of Elvis J. Stahr). Section 162(e) allows businesses to promote
their interests with tax deductible funds, while charitable interests are not similarly treated. Busi-
ness expenditures under § 162(e) are, however, deductible only when incurred for purposes of
affecting legislation that is "of direct interest to the taxpayer" or to "an organization of which he is
a member." Furthermore, there is no provision allowing deductions for expenditures incurred for
purposes of grass roots lobbying. Id at 14 (statement of William M. Goldstein, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 specifically allows electing organizations
to engage in lobbying, with a provision directly applicable to grass roots lobbying. See I.R.C.
501(h)(1), 4911(d) (1976). See infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570-73 (1945) (sustaining refusal by Illinois courts
to admit to the bar a candidate because he was a conscientious objector); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166-70 (1944) (sustaining statute banning distribution of religious literature by mi-
nor Jehovah's Witnesses); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (sustaining con-
viction of a Mormon under antipolygamy laws). See generaly L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 529-
43; Gianella, supra note 62, at 1386-95.
113. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per
curiam); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
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showing of a compelling state interest. 1 4 For a free exercise claim to
succeed, however, a showing of government coercion to surrender reli-
gious belief or forego religious conduct is necessary. 15 The Court's
decisions have evolved into a balancing test between "[religious] free-
doms and an exercise of state authority.""I6 This balancing of interests
has resulted in arguably inconsistent decisions." 7 The Court clearly
U.S. 624 (1943). Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (declaring unconstitutional a statute
requiring public officeholders to acknowledge a belief in God).
114. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 627 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 603 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 93 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
115. The Court identified this aspect of the free exercise clause in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963):
Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his reli-
gion. ... [A] violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion ....
Id at 223.
116. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963). One commentator stated that: "[T]he first amendment demands a balancing
test-where the interest of the state incidentally giving rise to interference with religious liberty is
minor and the religious interest burdened is substantial, the historic purpose of the free exercise
clause would suggest that the state be compelled to grant an exception." Gianella, supra note 62,
at 1389-90.
117. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court struck down a statute prohib-
iting religious organizations from soliciting without prior approval and determination of the bona
fides of the organization. Id at 307. Significantly, the Cantwell Court recognized the state's inter-
est in regulating religious conduct, since the absolute freedom of belief does not require a corre-
sponding absolute freedom of religiously motivated conduct. Id at 306. The Court stated that:
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection ...
[A] state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the
places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon;
and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the commu-
nity, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id at 304 (footnotes omitted).
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), a group of Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged
Sunday closing laws on the grounds that they infringed their free exercise rights. The Court re-
fused to strike down the statutes, relying on the compelling state interest in prescribing a uniform
day of rest. Chief Justice Warren based his majority opinion on the legitimate exercise of state
authority in legislating a general, nondiscriminatory law that advances the state's secular purpose
and goals. Such legislation is "valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance." Id at
607. The reasoning of the Braunfeld opinion was criticized in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
417-18 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax
Exemption, 42 FoaDHAm L. REV. 397, 411 n.102 (1973).
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment
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requires, however, that a state's interest must be "of the highest order
and . . . not otherwise served"" 8 to lawfully interfere with conduct
grounded on religious belief.119
Despite this requirement, economic regulations will often be upheld
as constitutional even though they conflict with religiously motivated
conduct. 2 ' In 1943, the Supreme Court held that a municipal ordi-
nance imposing a flat license tax on all persons canvassing or soliciting
was unconstitutional when applied to Jehovah's Witnesses distributing
and soliciting contributions for religious literature.121 Nevertheless, the
Court distinguished the flat license tax from income or property tax,' 22
thereby preventing the case from being read as a broad prohibition on
any form of taxation that conflicts with religious conduct. 23 Further-
compensation because she refused to take a position that would have required her to work on
Saturday, in violation of her religious beliefs. The Court held that this denial violated the free
exercise clause because there was no compelling state interest to justify the state action. Id at 406-
09. The Court indicated that the coercive result of the statute forced the appellant to "choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and aban-
doning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." Id at 404.
Thus, absent a compelling state interest, the coercion resulting from governmental interference
with the individual's religious precepts was an unconstitutional infringement of the first amend-
ment. Id at 406-09.
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that a uniform state
compulsory school attendance law could not be enforced against the Amish because their religion
prevented compliance. Id at 234-36. The Amish believe that allowing their children to attend
public school after the eighth grade endangers the child's, and parents', hopes for salvation. They
premise their belief on the need for separation from secular society; the emphasis on a life of
"goodness" rather than intellect; and the importance of manual labor and community to a devel-
oping child. Id at 211-13. The Court found that the state's interest in compelling school attend-
ance beyond the eighth grade was not "absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other
interests." Id at 215.
118. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
119. Id
120. See, e.g., United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1958) ("[T]he enforcement
of a reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation of conduct by governmental authority to preserve
peace, tranquility and a sound economic order does not violate the First Amendment merely be-
cause it may inhibit conduct on the part of individuals which is sincerely claimed by them to be
religiously motivated.") (emphasis added); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913, 918-19 (1961)
("We think it clear that, within the intendment of the first amendment, the Internal Revenue
Code, in imposing the income tax and requiring the filing of returns and the payment of the tax, is
not to be considered as restricting an individual's free exercise of this religion.").
121. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
122. Id at 112.
123. See, e.g., Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913 (1961). The court in Muste stated: "It is
clear [from Murdock] ... that a taxing statute is not contrary to the provisions of the first amend-
ment unless it directly restricts the free exercise by an individual of his religion." Id at 918
(footnote omitted). Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) ("To strike down, without
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more, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 124 the Court refused to hold that the
free exercise clause required property tax exemption. 25
The Internal Revenue Code restricts the conduct of tax exempt reli-
gious organizations by limiting the extent to which they may partici-
pate in politics. The economic regulation of religiously motivated
conduct ought to be sustained if confronted by a free exercise clause
attack. Such an attack would require a showing that the religious or-
ganization's interest in unrestricted political involvement1 26 outweighs
the government's interest in maintaining a "sound economic order"
and the separation of church and state.' 27  The Tenth Circuit and the
the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of
religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105. 111 (1943) ("IThe problem of drawing a line between a purely commercial activity and a
religious one will at times be difficult."). Justice Reed, in his dissenting opinion to Murdock,
stated:
Nor do we understand that the Court now maintains that the Federal Constitution
frees press or religion of any tax except such occupational taxes as those here levied.
Income taxes, ad valorem taxes, even otcupational taxes are presumably valid, save only
a license tax on sales of religious books. . . . It has never been thought before that
freedom from taxation was a perquisite attaching to the privileges of the First Amend-
ment. The National Government grants exemptions to ministers and churches because it
wishes to do so, not because the Constitution compels.
id at 129-30 (Reed, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter also recognized the importance of delimit-
ing the extent of the majority opinion:
[A] tax measure is not invalid under the federal Constitution merely because it falls upon
persons engaged in activities of a religious nature.
There is nothing in the Constitution which exempts persons engaged in religious activi-
ties from sharing equally in the costs of benefits to all, including themselves, provided by
government.
Id at 135, 140 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
124. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
125. Briefs amici curiae filed in Walz by the National Council of Churches of Christ and the
Synagogue Council of America maintained that the Constitution requires tax exemption for
church property.
[P]roperty used for religious purposes, including the house of worship, the religious sanc-
tuary, and all that is contained therein are so intimately connected with religious exercise
that to levy a direct tax upon the value of such property would constitute a tax on the
exercise of religion, having the same effect as that tax upon the itinerate evangelist which
the Court found unconstitutional in Murdock.
Brief Amici Curiae of the Synagogue Council of America and its Constituents at 11, Walz v. Tax
Comra'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), quoted in Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation. The Constitutional
Dilemma ofthe First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561, 571-72 (1980). See also D. KELLEY,
supra note 8.
126. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
127. See United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1958). See supra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text.
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Court of Claims have indicated that the government's interest in
preventing state subsidization of political activity by exempt organiza-
tions is compelling. 128 In addition, the Supreme Court in Cammarano
v. United States' 29 held that statutory reliance on political activity as
grounds for denying tax deductions for contributions to an exempt or-
ganization does not offend the first amendment. 130  The Code restric-
tions, therefore, probably would survive a free exercise attack and
thereby strengthen efforts to maintain separation of church and state
under the establishment clause.
II. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CHURCH POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The government grants tax exemptions to religious organizations be-
cause they provide a valuable benefit to the public by promoting the
social and moral welfare of society.' 3 ' The Revenue Act of 1894,32
contained the first provision granting tax exemptions to religious orga-
nizations. A similar provision has been incorporated into every subse-
quent revenue act. 133  In Walz v. Tax Commission,'134 the Supreme
128. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972),
("overwhelming and compelling"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Haswell v. United States, 500
F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974) ("compelling"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
129. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
130. Id at 506.
131.-.See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The State has an affirmative
policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and
finds this [exempt] classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest."); Trinidad v. Sa-
grada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) ("Evidently the exemption is made in
recognition of the benefit which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named,
and is intended to aid them when not conducted for private gain."); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
United States, 374 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1967) ("One stated reason for a deduction or exemption
of this kind is that the favored entity performs a public service and benefits the public or relieves it
of a burden which otherwise belongs to it."); Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir.
1951) ("The reason underlying the exemption granted. . . to organizations organized and oper-
ated for charitable purposes is that the exempted taxpayer performs a public service."); McGlotten
v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("the Government relieves itself of the burden of
meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
Government"). See also H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).
132. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. The 1894 Act was held unconstitutional
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
133. The current version ofthe following revenue acts is at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 101(6), 53 Stat. 33; Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, § 101(6), 52 Stat. 481; Act
of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 101(6), 49 Stat. 1674; Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 103(6), 47 Stat.
193; Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 103(6), 45 Stat. 813; Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 231(6), 44
Stat. 40; Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 231(6), 43 Stat. 282; Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 231(6),
42 Stat. 253; Act of Feb. 24, 1918, ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1076; Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463,
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Court held that tax exemptions for religious organizations were consti-
tutional. 135  The Court upheld a New York statute granting a tax ex-
emption for property used exclusively for religious purposes. 3 6  No
excessive entanglement of government with religion resulted from the
exemption. 137
The Internal Revenue Code of 1934138 contained the first political
activity restrictions. The provision was intended to prohibit tax exempt
organizations from "influenc[ing] legislation and carry[ing] on propa-
ganda." 139 In 1954, the Code was amended to include a restriction on
exempt organizations intervening in campaign activities.140 The provi-
sion prohibits all tax exempt religious and charitable groups from inter-
vening in election campaigns. 14 1 This prohibition was not changed by
the 1976 Tax Reform Act. 142 The 1976 Act did, however, substantially
alter the restrictions on permissible lobbying by exempt organizations.
§ 1 l(a)(6), 39 Stat. 766; Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, II, par.G(a), 38 Stat. 172; Act of Aug. 5, 1909,
ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113.
The provision exempting "charitable, religious and educational" organizations, Act of Aug. 27,
1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556, was amended to include "scientific" organizations in the Act of
Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, II, para.G(a), 38 Stat. 172; organizations formed for the "prevention of cruelty
to children or animals" in the Act of Feb. 24, 1918, ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1076; "literary"
organizations in the Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 231(6), 42 Stat. 253; and organizations whose
purpose is "testing for public safety" in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954). See generaly McGovern, The
Exemption Proyisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 528-29 (1976).
134. 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970).
135. Id
136. The challenged New York statute provided: "Real property owned by a corporation or
association organized exclusively for ... religious ... purposes ...and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes... shall be exempt from taxation as pro-
vided in this section." N.Y. REAL Paop. TAX LAW § 421(a)(a) (Consol. 1958). The Court upheld
the statute on the grounds that granting tax exemptions to churches involves less governmental
entanglement than taxing would. 397 U.S. at 674. The legislative purpose of the exemption was
not to establish or sponsor religion, but simply a desire by the state to avoid inhibiting valuable
organizations. Id at 672. Thus, the Court found that tax exemption for church property was not
an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Id at 678.
137. 397 U.S. at 674.
138. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, §§ 23(o)(2), 101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 690, 700. This provision
was later incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
139. 78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934) (remarks of Senator Harrison). See Comment, supra note 9,
at 488 & n.56.
140. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). See Note, supra note 8, at 547-48.
141. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
142. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended the restriction on attempts to influence legislation
by adding § 501(h), but left unchanged the restriction on campaign involvement. Pub. L. No. 94-
455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(h) (1976)).
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Prior to the addition of section 501(h),11 3 churches and charitable orga-
nizations had difficulty determining what constituted substantial lobby-
ing activity under section 501(c)(3).'" The 1976 Act clarified the
ambiguity of the "substantiality test" by providing guidelines for ex-
empt organizations to determine the limits of permissible lobbying.45
Nevertheless, section 501(c)(3) still conditions tax exemption on an or-
ganization's limiting its political activity.'4 6 This provision continues
to face criticism by commentators and religious groups because of the
chilling effect it has on church political activity.'47 It has also been
attacked because of inherent ambiguities and constitutional problems
with the restriction.' 48 Nevertheless, amending or eliminating the pres-
ent Code limitations is unnecessary because of the increased flexibility
and clarifications in the 1976 Tax Reform Act.' 49
A. Lobbying Restrictions
Prior to the 1976 Act, judicial interpretation of the political activity
restrictions in the Code focused on the requirement that the organiza-
tion be organized and operated "exclusively" for' 50 exempt pur-
143. I.R.C. § 501(h) (1976). See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., "Americans United," Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd ai
other grounds sub nom Commissioner v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Christian
Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
864 (1973). See also Clark, supra note 10; Note, supra note 8; Comment, Tax Subsidies/or Polit.
ical Particpation, 31 TAX LAW. 461 (1978). For a discussion of the interpretation and history of
the substantiality test, see Caplin & Timbie, Legislative Activities ofPublic Charities, 39 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 183 (1978). See also infra note 174 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
146. The organization's tax exempt status is also subject to the "exclusive purpose" require-
ment of § 501(c)(3). See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
147. See Hearings on HA 13500, supra note 8, at 63-64, 75-76, 90-91 (statements by leaders of
various religious organizations). See also D. KELLEY, supra note 8.
148. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
150. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). The exclusive purpose requirement does not require that the
organization's sole purpose be religious or charitable. Rather, the provision requires the articles
of organization to limit the purposes of the organization to one or more exempt purposes, and to
prohibit the organization from engaging in substantial extra-exempt purpose activities. Thus, the
provision's use of the term "exclusively" should be read as "substantially" or "primarily." See
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1954). Cf. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279
(1945); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924); St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967); Stevens Bros. Found. v. Commissioner, 324
F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963); Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955); Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Fides Publishers Ass'n. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl.
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poses,15 1 or on the requirement that "no substantial part of the
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962). See generally B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 152-54 (3d ed. 1979); P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS 64-65 (1979).
If an organization's articles of organization indicate purposes outside the specified permissible
purposes of § 501(c)(3), it will not pass the "organizational" test. This remains true even if the
actual operation of the organization is limited to exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(b)(l)(iv) (1954). See infra note 151. Only a "creating document" is used to determine if the
"organizational" test is satisfied. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
HANDBOOK 322(4) (1981). See also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir.
1950); Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947); Roche's Beach Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp.
863 (D.D.C. 1973); Lewis v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961); Samuel Friedman
Found. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956); Forest Press, Inc., 22 T.C. 265 (1954).
The Internal Revenue Code also requires that the organization be "operated" exclusively for
exempt purposes. The "operational" test under the regulations requires that the organization:
engage primarily in exempt purpose activities; not allow any part of its net earnings to inure to the
benefit of private individuals; and not be an action organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(c)(3)(i) (1954). See supra note 37. See also Old Dominion Box Co. v. United States, 477 F.2d
340 (4th Cir.) (earnings inured to private benefit), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Stevens Bros.
Found. v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963) (operation not exclusively for exempt pur-
poses), cert. denied 376 U.S. 969 (1964); Kenner v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1963)
(same); Scholarship Endowment Found. v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1939) (same);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (same), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); American Inst. for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934
(Ct. CI. 1962) (same), cert. denied 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Hofer v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 672
(1928) (earnings inured to private benefit); Rev. Rul. 69-279, 1969-1 C.B. 152 (same); Rev. Rul.
60-351, 1960-2 C.B. 169 (same). But see Commissioner v. Teich, 407 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam); Francis Edward McGillick Found. v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1960); Com-
missioner v. Orton Ceramic Found., 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949); Lewis v. United States, 189 F.
Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961); Rev. Rul. 76-91, 1976-1 C.B. 149; Rev. Rul. 71-29, 1971-1 C.B. 150;
Rev. Rul. 69-39, 1969-1 C.B. 148; Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121.
151. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). The organization must be organized and operated exclusively
for one or more of the following exempt purposes: religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educa-
tional, prevention of cruelty to children or animals, fostering national or international sports com-
petition (but only if no part of the organization's activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or testing for public safety. Id See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (1954).
Courts and the Internal Revenue Service are reluctant to inquire into the type of religion, and
particularly the worthiness or desirability of the religious organization's purposes. The Board of
Tax Appeals stated:
Religion is not confined to a sect or a ritual. The symbols of religion to one are anath-
ema to another.... Congress left open the door of tax exemption to all corporations
meeting the test, the restriction being not as to the species of religion, charity, science or
education under which they may operate, but as to the use of its profits and the exclusive
purpose of its existence.
Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926). See Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412
F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969); Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1963); Universal Life
Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Golden Rule Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719
(1964); Saint Germain Found., 26 T.C. 648 (1956); A.A. Allen Revivals, Inc., 22 T.C.M. 1435
(1963); Rev. Rul. 75-434, 1975-2 I.R.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 74-575, 1974-2 C.B. 161; Rev. Rul. 71-580,
Washington University Open Scholarship
532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:503
activities" be aimed at influencing legislation or interfering with polit-
ical campaigns.'52 In Slee v. Commissioner,'53 the Second Circuit ap-
plied the "exclusive purpose 154 test"'155 to determine whether a
contribution made to the American Birth Control League 56 was tax
deductible as a charitable contribution. The Court found that the pur-
pose for organizing the League was charitable,' 57 but that contributions
made to it were not tax deductible because its political activity was not
ancillary to its primary purpose. The Court determined that the polit-
ical activity engaged in was general, and therefore the League was not
organized exclusively for charitable purposes.'58
In Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 59 the Third Circuit used a
more flexible approach to the exclusive purpose problem and held that
a bequest to the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals
of the Methodist Episcopal Church'60 was a tax deductible contribution
1971-2 C.B. 235; Rev. Rul. 68-72, 1968-1 C.B. 250. But see Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc.
v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Parker v. Com-
missioner, 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Riker v. Commissioner,
244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 839 (1957); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
152. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
153. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
154. Id at 184.
155. The applicable statute in Slee was § 214(a)(1 1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1921,
and § 214(a)(10) of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926. See supra note 133.
156. The American Birth Control League was organized to study "the relationship of con-
trolled and uncontrolled procreation to national and world problems." 42 F.2d at 184. The
League also ran a free clinic in New York and engaged in attempts to change existing laws con-
cerning birth control. Id at 184-85.
157. Id at 185.
158. Id Judge Hand stated that "[p]olitical agitation as such, is outside the statute, however
innocent the aim .... Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public subvention;
the Treasury stands aside from them." Id See also Alfred A. Cook, 30 B.T.A. 292 (1934) (City
Club of New York held not a tax deductible charitable organization because it advocated legisla-
tion for better municipal government); Bertha Poole Weyl, 18 B.T.A. 1092 (1930) (Massachusetts
Anti-Saloon League held not a tax deductible charitable organization because it was involved in
partisan political propaganda); Jos. M. Price, 12 B.T.A. 1186 (1928) (New York City Bar Asssocia-
tion held not a tax deductible charitable organization because it conducted a grand jury investiga-
tion into administration of bankruptcy laws); Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828 (1926) (Massachusetts
Anti-Cigarette League held not a tax deductible charitable organization because it was involved in
partisan political propaganda). But see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass.
1938) (New England Anti-Vivesection Society held a tax deductible charitable organization be-
cause political activities of the group were incidental to its primary exempt purpose).
159. 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941).
160. The Board was formed to "promote the cause of temperance by every legitimate means;
to prevent the improper use of drugs and narcotics; to render aid to such causes as. . . tend to
advance the public welfare." Id at 109.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/6
Number 2] TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
to a charitable organization. 6 1 The court stated that although the
Board was engaged in political activity, the source of such activity was
clearly a religious belief and was central to the purposes for
organization.'
62
Judicial interpretations of the substantiality test, as in the exclusive
purpose test, failed to provide guidelines on the acceptable limits of
political activity for exempt organizations. In 1955, the Sixth Circuit
held that the political activity of the Hamilton County Good Govern-
ment League was not substantial because it did not exceed five percent
of the League's total activities. 163 The court did not explain the choice
of the five percent figure as the appropriate limit. In Christian Echoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,'" the Tenth Circuit rejected
the use of a percentage test in favor of balancing the political activities
with the objectives and circumstances of the organization.'65 In United
States v. Haswell,6 6 the Court of Claims applied the balancing test of
Christian Echoes,'6 7 considering both the percentage of the organiza-
161. Id at 110-11.
162. Id at 110. Judge Clark argued in dissent that:
[Tlhere is a faint odor of harm in the use of money to present only one side of any
proposition. To paraphrase [Voltaire], it may place the Lord on the side of the heaviest
money-bags. Although, therefore, one may not object, he may assuredly refrain from
encouraging--either by way of offering the state's help in enforcement or in subvention.
Id at 114 (Clark, J., dissenting).
163. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
164. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), ceri. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
165. Id at 855. Christian Echoes involved a suit by a nonprofit religious organization for
refund of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes. The organization's tax exempt status
was revoked by the Internal Revenue Service for three reasons: it did not satisfy the § 501(c)(3)
exclusive purpose requirement; it engaged in substantial lobbying activity; and it was involved in
political campaign activity. The district court ruled that Christian Echoes was entitled to rein-
statement of its tax exempt status. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. Id at
858. The court held that the lobbying activity of the organization was "substantial" when bal-
anced with the "objectives and circumstances" of the group. Id at 855-56. Furthermore, the
involvement of the organization in political campaign efforts supported the decision by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to revoke its tax exempt status. Id at 856.
166. 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). Haswell involved a tax-
payer suit for refund of income taxes on the theory that contributions to the National Association
of Railroad Passengers (NARP) were tax deductible under § 170(c)(2). The court, in applying the
Christian Echoes rationale, held that the organization's political activities constituted a substantial
part of its total efforts when balanced with its objectives and purposes. Id at 1147. The court
found that the dollar amounts spent by NARP on legislative efforts indicated that "its purposes no
longer accord with conceptions traditionally associated with a common-law charity. . . . The
legislative program was a primary objective in NARP's total operations for preservation of rail-
road passenger service and is on an equal footing with its educational and litigative efforts." Id.
167. Id at 1142.
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tion's expenditures for lobbying activity t68 and the purpose of the or-
ganization's operation.
Judicial interpretation of the Code restrictions on political activity
has created ambiguity on two levels: first, whether the exclusive pur-
pose or the substantiality test is determinative; and second, if the latter,
what constitutes substantial participation. 169 Commentators have sug-
gested complete elimination of the Code restrictions on lobbying activ-
ity,170 or taxation of exempt organizations for lobbying expenditures
while permitting partisan campaign activity.' 7 ' These commentators
posit as reasons for the proposed changes continued confusion by ex-
empt organizations and the potential misuse of the Internal Revenue
Service's investigative power.' 72  The 1976 Act, 73 however, clarified
the interpretive problems confronting the courts, especially in regard to
the substantiality test. 74  Under section 501(h), electing 75 organiza-
tions may participate in lobbying activities if they do not exceed the
168. Id at 1146.
169. See generally Note, Lobbying by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations Under the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 A Proposalfor Change, 30 TAX LAW. 214, 217-20 (1976). See supra notes 150-68 and
accompanying text.
170. See Comment, supra note 9, at 502.
171. See Note, supra note 8, at 555. See also Note, supra note 169, at 236-38.
172. See supra notes 150-68 and accompanying text. The district court in Christian Echoes
found that the Internal Revenue Service violated the fifth amendment due process clause by arbi-
trarily selecting Christian Echoes as an "example." The court found, in addition, that the Internal
Revenue Service violated its own procedural rules in its investigation of the organization and used
the § 501(c)(3) restrictions as an "oppressive tool." Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 28 A.F.T.R. 2d 71-5260, -5943 to -5946.
173. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
174. The legislative history identifies the ambiguity and indicates the purpose behind the
§ 501(h) provision:
[N]either Treasury regulations nor court decisions have given enough detailed meaning
to the statutory language to permit most charitable organizations to know approximately
where the limits are between what is permitted by the statute and what is forbidden by it.
The committee amendment is designed to set relatively specific expenditure limits to
replace the uncertain standards of present law, to provide a more rational relationship
between the sanctions and the violations of standards, and to make it more practical to
properly enforce the law.
S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4030, 4104.
175. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 allows eligible exempt organizations to elect to replace the
substantiality test with the percentage limitations on influencing legislation under § 501(h) and
§ 4911. S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at 4105. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying
text.
An organization may elect to have its legislative activities measured by the new test at any time
before the end of the taxable year and have the rules apply for that year. H.R. REP. No. 1210,
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maximum yearly limit of $1,000,000.176 The new section also contains
a separate provision for "grass roots expenditures," '77 which limits
electing organizations to twenty-five percent of the nontaxable lobby-
ing amount. T'7  The amount that exceeds the limitation on expenditures
is subject to a twenty-five percent excise tax.179 An electing organiza-
tion will only lose its exempt status if, over a four year period, its ex-
penditures exceed 150% of the applicable limitations."' The new
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 n.2 (1976). Nonelecting or ineligible organizations remain subject to the
substantiality text. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
The 1976 Act made § 501(h) elective in part because the new percentage limitations require
more detailed recordkeeping and disclosure requirements under § 6033(b)(8) than did the former
law. H.R. REP. No. 1210, supra, at 15. See also Montgomery, Lobbying by Public Charities Under
the Tax Reform Act of1976, 51 TAXES 449, 450 n.8 (1978).
176. The percentage limitations of § 4911 provide that an organization's permitted yearly ex-
penditures for lobbying-lobbying nontaxable amount--is the lesser of $1,000,000 or:
If the proposed The lobbying nontaxable amount is -
expenditures are -
Not over $500,000 ......... 20% of the exempt purpose expenditures.
Over $500,000 but not
over $1,000,000 ........... $100,000, plus 15% of the excess of the exempt purpose
expenditures over $500,000.
Over $1,000,000 but
not over $1,500,000 ........ $175,000, plus 10% of the excess of the exempt purpose
expenditures over $1,000,000.
Over $1,500,000 ........... $225,000, plus 5% of the excess of the exempt purpose
expenditures over $1,500,000.
I.R.C. § 491 1(c)(2) (1976). The "exempt purpose expenditure" is the total amount paid or in-
curred to accomplish the exempt purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B). This includes administra-
tive and lobbying expenses, whether or not for exempt purposes, but not fundraising expenses.
I.R.C. § 4911 (e)(1)(A), (B), (C) (1976). See also S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174.
177. "Grass roots expenditures" are those used to "influence legislation through an attempt to
affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof." I.R.C. § 491(d)(1)(A) (1976).
178. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4) (1976).
179. I.R.C. § 4911(a) (1976).
180. H.R. REP. No. 1210, supra note 175, at 9 n.2; S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at
4105-06. Loss of tax exemption results if "normally" an organization's lobbying expenditures, or
grass roots expenditures, exceed 150% of the permissible overall expenditures. "Normally" means
the average over a four year period. An organization's lobbying expenditures normally exceeds
150% of the permissible amount if the sum of its lobbying expenditures for the four years immedi-
ately preceding is greater than 150% of the sum of the permissible expenditures for the same four
years. S. RE. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at 4106 n.3.
Electing organizations that lose their tax exempt status as a result of excessive lobbying will not
be eligible for exemption on their own income as a § 501(c)(4) social welfare organization. S. REP.
No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at 4107-08. Prior to the 1976 Act, the Treasury Department regula-
tions allowed an organization that lost its exempt status under § 501(c)(3) because of excessive
lobbying to qualify for income tax exemption under § 501(c)(4). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(c)(3)(v) (1954). The purpose for the added sanction against organizations involved in excessive
lobbying was that
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provisions clarify the substantiality test, and give electing organizations
greater potential for lobbying than the courts had given.' Further-
more, the four year period in which the determination will be made
permits increased flexibility in expenditures.'82 Nevertheless, the 1976
Act did not alter the exclusive purpose test; electing organizations must
continue to limit their lobbying activities to purposes consistent with
this restriction.' 83
Congress disqualified churches from the percentage expenditure pro-
visions 1 4 because of the churches' free exercise challenge to political
activity restrictions. 85 Churches were, in addition, reluctant to subject
a number of organizations that [had] . . .shifted to section 501(c)(4) [had] created re-
lated organizations to carry on their charitable activities, to qualify for exemption under
section 501(c)(3), and to qualify to receive deductible charitable contributions. If the
original organization [had] built up a substantial endowment during its years of section
501(c)(3) status, it could then carry on its "excessive" lobbying activities financed by the
income it receive[d] from its tax-deducting endowment. As a result, although there may
have been some inconvenience and administrative confusion during the changeover pC-
riod, it was possible in such a case for the lobbying rules to be violated without any
significant tax consequences.
S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at 4105 n.l.
181. Cf Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955) ("something less than 50%
of the time and effort" held not substantial).
182. See Note, supra note 169, at 235 n.l 14. See also Comment, supra note 9, at 492. Section
491 l(d)(l) defines "influencing legislation." See supra note 177 and accompanying text. In addi-
tion to grass roots lobbying, the Act includes direct lobbying in its definition of "influencing
legislation":
"[Alny attempt to influence any legislation through communication with any member or em-
ployee of a legislative body, or with any government official or employee who may participate in
the formulation of the legislation."
I.R.C. § 491 l(d)(1) (1976). "Legislation" refers to actions taken on Acts, bills and resolutions by
Congress, state legislatures, local governments, or by the public in a referendum, constitutional
amendment, or similar proceedings. I.R.C. § 4911 (e)(2) (1976). "Action" refers only to the intro-
duction, enactment, amendment, repeal, or defeat of legislation. I.R.C. § 4911 (e)(3) (1976).
Section 491 l(d)(2) lists available exceptions. Activities that are excluded from "influencing leg-
islation" are: supplying the results of nonpartisan study or research; providing technical advice to
a governmental body that has requested it; and appearing before, or communicating to, a legisla-
tive body when a decision is pending that might directly affect the organization's tax exempt status
or its power and duties. Id
183. See Comment, supra note 9, at 495; Comment, supra note 144, at 478.
184. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
185. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5) (1976). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 does not affect church organiza-
tions because religious leaders requested exclusion from the electing provisions. They argued that
restrictions on political activity are unconstitutional as applied to churches and "integrated auxil-
iar[ies] of a church or of a convention or association of churches," See H.R. REP. No. 1210, supra
note 175, at 15; S. REP. No. 938-pt. II, supra note 174, at 4108; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTER-
NAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SSS., SUMMARY OF IssuEs: H.R. 13500 "LOBBYING"
BY CHARiTias 6 (Comm. Print 1976). Thus, § 501(h)(4) limits the eligible electing organizations to
§501(c)(3) organizations subject to: § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (educational organizations);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/6
Number 2] TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
themselves to Internal Revenue Service scrutiny by filing detailed in-
formation returns, a further requirement under the 1976 Act.1 16 The
problem with the disqualifying provision is that churches and nonelect-
ing organizations will still be subject to the judicial interpretation of the
ambiguous substantiality test.187
B. Political Campaigns
The prohibition of exempt organization involvement in political
campaigns under section 501(c)(3) remained unchanged by the 1976
Tax Reform Act. 88 Under this provision, tax exempt organizations
under section 501 (a) are prohibited from participating or intervening in
a candidate's'8 9 campaign for political office. 190 This proscription in-
cludes the publication or distribution of statements by exempt organi-
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(iii) (medical research organizations and hospitals); § 170(b)(1)(A)(iv) (organiza-
tions supported by charitable contributions); and § 509(a)(3), (4) (organizations supported by pub-
lic charities).
Congress isolated churches from the effect of the 1976 Act by refusing to approve or disapprove
of the decision in Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.
1972) (holding political activities restrictions constitutional), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); by
excluding churches from the sanction prohibiting exempt organizations from becoming § 501(c)(4)
organizations upon loss of exempt status, see § 504(c); by adopting a no comment position on
definitions by the Department of Treasury on affiliated church organizations, see S. REP. No. 938-
pt. II, supra note 174, at 4109; and by excluding churches from the provision prohibiting donor
deductions of out-of-pocket lobbying expenditures, see § 170(0(6). See Washburn, New Tax Act
Defines "Substantial" Lobbying-But Charities Must Elect to be Covered, 55 TAXEs 291, 292 n.5
(1979). See generally Schwarz, supra note 7.
186. Hearings on HR 13500, supra note 8, at 90-91 (statement of James L. Robinson). Reli-
gious and charitable organizations consistently objected to the substantiality test on the grounds
that the Internal Revenue Service was discriminatory and inconsistent in its enforcement. See
Legislative Activity by Certain Types fExempt Organizations. Hearings on H 13720 andRelated
Bills Before the House Comm on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Mont-
gomery, supra note 175, at 450 n.6.
The 1976 Act amended the § 6033 requirement that exempt organizations file a yearly informa-
tion report. Under amended § 6033(b)(8), electing organizations must file an information return,
indicate the amount of its lobbying expenditures, both overall and grass roots, and indicate the
permissible nontaxable amount of expenditures, both overall and grass roots. If the electing or-
ganization is a member of an affiliated group, it must provide this information for both itself and
the entire group. I.R.C. § 6033(bX8) (1976). See also Comment, supra note 9, at 494-95 n.102.
187. I.R.C. § 501(h)(7) (1976). See Note, supra note 169, at 215.
188. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
189. A candidate for political office is "an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by
others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national, state, or local."
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii) (1954).
190. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
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zation on "behalf of or in opposition to. . . candidate[s]."'' l
In Christian Echoes,'92 the Tenth Circuit broadly construed the
meaning of the prohibition against political campaign activity. 193 The
court held that the political activity of the religious organization, which
included attempts to influence legislation' 94 and participation in polit-
ical campaigns, 195 precluded the reinstatement of tax exempt status to
the organization.' 96 The extent of the political involvement by the or-
ganization was found to be "substantial and continuous" rather than an
incidental part of the organization's general activity.' 97 The court's de-
cision was based primarily on the organization's attempts to influence
legislation, but it also addressed the issue of the organization's partici-
pation in political campaign activity. The court found that the organi-
zation had attacked several candidates and officeholders who were
considered too "liberal" and had supported others considered to be
"Christian conservative statesmen."' 98 The court stated that this activ-
ity indicated an intent to change the "composition" of the govern-
ment, 199 and was therefore contrary to the type of activity in which
Congress intended exempt organizations to participate. 2°°
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii) (1954). For a discussion of the definitional problems
in the campaign activity prohibition, see Comment, supra note 9, at 496-97.
192. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
193. Id at 856. The court relied on the limiting language of the regulations:
Activities which constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf
of or in opposition to a candidate include, but are not limited to, the publication or
distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on behalf
of or in opposition to such a candidate.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii) (1954). 'See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
194. 470 F.2d at 854-56. The court criticized the district court's narrow construction of the
statutory language. Id at 854. The Christian Echoes publication contained numerous attempts to
influence legislation. The absence of specific legislation did not remove it from the statutory limi-
tation. The court listed 22 specific instances of "influencing" activity. Among these were appeals
to readers to write their Congressmen for: retention of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities; cutting off diplomatic relations with communist countries; abolishing federal income
taxes; and withdrawing from the United Nations. Id at 855.
195. Id at 856. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
196. Id
197. Id
198. Id at 852. Christian Echoes levelled vehement attacks against President Kennedy and
Senators Fulbright and Humphrey, and supported Senators Thurmond and Goldwater. Id at
856.
199. Id at 856.
200. The statutory proscription on political campaign activity is couched in absolute terms.
The Christian Echoes court interpreted the facts of the case in light of the absolute proscription in
§ 501(c)(3). The Internal Revenue Service, however, has not applied such a literal construction.
Organizations have successfully argued that support of, or an attack on, a candidate for political
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The Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation of the Code provision has
been criticized because the holding implies that all officeholders are
candidates."' Exempt organizations would be prohibited from criticiz-
ing political positions taken by "candidates" while they were in of-
fice. 2  Nevertheless, the opinion reflects the underlying policy of the
Code provisions that religious and charitable organizations may not
participate in partisan political activity. 2°3 The criticism of the Chris-
tian Echoes decision 2" also reflects a concern that the electioneering
prohibition infringes the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
20 5
The Supreme Court has indicated that the first amendment free speech
guarantees protect both individual members of society and organiza-
tions.2°6  Therefore, in every case the strong policies underlying the
Code provisions must be balanced against free speech protection.20 7
office was outside the context of a "political campaign." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B.
160, Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246. Other organizations have successfully argued that the
activity was only to elevate the ethical standards of political campaigns. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-
574, 1974-2 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213. See generally P. TREUSCH & N.
SUGARMAN, supra note 150, at 167-76.
201. See. e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 498.
202. Id
203. The Christian Echoes court argued that the legislative history of the Code restrictions
required withdrawal of the organization's tax exempt status:
The Congressional purposes evidenced by the 1934 and 1954 amendments are clearly
constitutionally justified in keeping with the separation and neutrality principles particu-
larly applicable in these cases and, more succinctly, the principle that government shall
not subsidize, directly or indirectly, those organizations whose substantial activities are
directed toward the accomplishment of legislative goals or the election or defeat of par-
ticular candidates.
470 F.2d at 857. See also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959); Slee v. Commis-
sioner. 42 F.2d 184, 184 (2d Cir. 1930); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1148 (Ct. Cl.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
204. See. e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 555; Comment, supra note 9, at 511-12.
205. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 551.
206. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia Pharmacy Bd.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See also Comment, Political Speech of Charitable Organizations Under
the lmernal Revenue Code, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 352 (1974); Note, supra note 8, at 551 & n.80.
207. The court in Christian Echoes compared the limitations on freedom of speech by exempt
organizations to the Hatch Political Activity Act (Hatch Act) restrictions on state and federal
employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1976). The court stated the analogy as follows:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right,
we hold that the limitations contained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from
nonprofit corporations do not deprive Christian Echoes of its constitutionally guaranteed
right of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such activities without restraint,
subject, however, to withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer
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The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code restricting political in-
volvement by religious organizations indicate congressional efforts 20° to
give effect to the historical and judicial understanding of the first
amendment as requiring separation of church and state.2 0 9  Courts
have had difficulty interpreting the language of the Code with respect
to the limitations on legislative lobbying and political campaigning.
These problems of interpretation do not, however, require the complete
elimination of the provisions.2 10  The 1976 Tax Reform Act provides
sufficient clarity to exempt organizations and the courts. The free exer-
cise arguments raised by churches21' must eventually be decided by the
Supreme Court. Until then, the Internal Revenue Code provisions pro-
may refrain from such activities and obtain the privilege of exemption. The parallel to
the "Hatch Act" prohibitions . . . is clear: The taxpayer may opt to enter an area of
federal employment subject to the restraints and limitations upon his First Amendment
rights. Conversely, he may opt not to receive employment funds at the public trough in
the areas covered by the restraints and thus exercise his First Amendment rights
unfettered.
470 F.2d at 857. The court implied that limitations placed on the right to freedom of speech are
justified by a compelling state interest. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. See also
Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1150 (Ct. CI. 1974) ("Congressional interest in prevention
of the use of tax funds to support lobbying is compelling."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). See
generally Note, supra note 169, at 224-25.
208. See 115 CONG. REC. 38,887 (1967) (remarks of Representative Blackburn) ("the basic
reason for [the Internal Revenue Code restrictions] is that all groups within the political arena
should work under the same set of handicaps. To allow churches involved in political propaganda
a special tax-exempt status is to subsidize political activities by these groups.").
209. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) ("government is to be entirely
excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of govern-
ment."). See also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203. 212 (1948) (the First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."). For a discussion
of Madison's view of the meaning of the religion clauses, see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
210. But see Comment, supra note 9, at 534.
211. See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court was prevented from
a direct ruling on the constitutionality of the political activity restrictions because of procedural
difficulties in Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), and Commissioner v. "American
United", Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). But see Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d
1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
Church leaders have also argued that predicating tax exemption on political noninvolvement
violates the establishment clause. They argue that political activity restrictions "establish" reli-
gious organizations that are silent on public issues by granting them tax exemptions, while deny-
ing, or threatening to deny, exemption to those organizations that are active in politics. See, e.g.,
Hearings on H. 13500, supra note 8, at 82 (statement of William P. Thompson). See also D.
KELLEY, supra note 8, at 79-82.
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vide needed restrictions on church political activity.21 2
III. THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
The conflict between the first amendment religion clauses and the
Internal Revenue Code has become increasingly controversial in recent
years because of the IRS's continuing attack on private schools that
discriminate on the basis of race. Since 1970, the IRS has denied or
withdrawn tax exempt status of private schools with racially discrimi-
natory admissions policies.2" 3 In 1975, the IRS extended the policy to
religious schools which claimed that their religious beliefs required ra-
cial discrimination. 214  The schools immediately challenged this posi-
tion in the courts,2"5 resulting in severe criticism of the IRS policy.
216
In addition, IRS procedures for determining the racial policies of pri-
vate sectarian and nonsectarian schools have raised serious first amend-
ment religion clause questions.21 7 Nevertheless, this Note argues that
there is substantial support for the IRS position and that the use of tax
exemption is a proper means for enforcing a clear federal policy against
racial discrimination.21 8
212. See supra notes 131-49.
213. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), 11970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6790. Cf.
IRS News Release (July 19, 1970), [1970)] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) $ 6814 ("applicable to
all private schools, whether church related or not"). See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127
(D.D C.), appeal dismissed sub nom, Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970),permanent injunction
issued sub nom Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), af 'd mem. sub noma. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Tax-Exempt Status of Private
Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means (pt.
2). 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1306-07 (1979) (statement of Randolph V. Thrower) [hereinafter cited as
Status Hearings (pi. 2)]; Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools,
60 TEx. L. REV. 259, 259 nn.5-6 (1982).
214. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158. See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Dis-
crimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378, 380 n.14 (1979).
215. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-3).
216. See Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Dis-
criminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Comm on Ways and Means, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 143 (1982) (statement of Edward Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, Department of
Justice); id at 173 (statement of Richard T. MeNamar, Deputy Secretary, Department of Treas-
ury); id at 243 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Administration's Change in Policy Hearing].
217. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 251-83. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-3); Green v. Con-
nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C.), afgd mem sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
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A. Development of Current IRS Policies Concerning Racially
Discriminatory Schools
In 1970 the IRS reversed its earlier policy that all private schools,
regardless of segregationist attitudes, were charitable organizations
under section 501(c)(3). 1l9 The decision to define more clearly the gov-
ernment's position resulted from a class action suit brought by black
students and their parents in Mississippi challenging the IRS's pre-1970
policy.220  In Green v. Connelly,22  a three-judge federal district court
upheld the IRS's newly articulated position 22 that it would refuse to
grant tax exempt status to all private schools practicing racial discrimi-
nation. 23 In ordering the IRS to withdraw tax exemptions from segre-
gationist schools in Mississippi, 24 the district court argued that a
declared federal policy against racial discrimination "overrides any as-
(1971);Administration's Change in Policy Hearing, supra note 214, at 12 (statement of Laurence H.
Tribe); id at 115-17 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue); id
at 270 (statement of John S. Nolan, Chairman, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association).
219. In 1965, the IRS suspended action on applications for tax exemptions by racially discrim-
inatory schools, but in 1967 returned to its earlier position of approving all such applications.
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (1970); Status Hearings (pl. 1), supra note 6, at 3
(opening statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue) (citing IRS News Re-
lease, Aug. 2, 1967). See supra note 213 and accompanying text. See generally Note, supra note
214, at 379-80 & n.5 (explaining the IRS return to its earlier position).
220. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'dmem sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971). See Weithorn, The Latest Phenomenon: Government Subsidization of Racial Dis-
crimination, 14 TAx NOTES 299, 299 (1982) ("no sharply defined governmental policy against
racial discrimination practiced by private schools").
221. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), a.fdmem, sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
222. See IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6790.
The IRS issued its press release during litigation in Green v. Connally. The timing of this policy
reversal became important in subsequent litigation because the Supreme Court stated in dictum
that its aflirmance of Green lacked "the precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary
controversy." See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.l 1 (1974) (denying request to
enjoin IRS from revoking tax exempt status of Bob Jones University, see infra notes 289-314 and
accompanying text). See generalo Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 11, at 240 n.77 (outlining
the Green decision that ratified the new IRS position).
223. 330 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
224. Id at 1173-76. The Green court specifically ordered the IRS to deny tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory schools in Mississippi, id at 1179, and required applicants thereafter to
publicize in the community a policy of nondiscrimination, id at 1179-80. See infra notes 232-34
and accompanying text (discussing IRS formalization of the Green order in Rev. Rul. 71-447,
1971-2 C.B. 230). The Green court's permanent injunction is still in effect, see infra notes 264-67
and accompanying text. Administration's Change in Policy Hearing, supra note 216, at 116 (state-
ment of Jerome Kurtz, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue). See id at 270 (statement of
John S. Nolan, Chairman, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association) ("it cannot be seri-
ously asserted that there is any doubt about the power and duty under the law as it exists today").
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sertion of value in practicing private racial discrimination, whether
ascribed to philosophical pluralism or divine inspiration for racial seg-
regation." '225 The court, in support of this argument, cited the thir-
teenth amendment, 226 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,227 and several
landmark Supreme Court decisions.228  Relying on this clear federal
policy and the common law of charitable trusts, 229 the court concluded
that its construction of the relevant Code provisions and its grant of a
permanent injunction avoided the frustration of federal policy.23 ° The
Supreme Court affirmed Green without opinion.23'
In 1971, the IRS extended and "formalized" the effect of Green232 by
issuing a revenue ruling233 requiring nondiscriminatory admissions
policies for all private schools seeking qualification for tax exemp-
tion.234 This ruling was expanded in 1972 when the IRS issued a reve-
225. 330 F. Supp. at 1163.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See supra note 18.
227. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
228. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
229. 330 F. Supp. at 1159-64. For a detailed discussion of the charitable trust doctrine and the
public policy argument relied on in Green and its progeny, see infra notes 253-83 and accompany-
ing text. See generally Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious
Schools, 36 TAx L. REv. 477, 485-500 (1981).
230. 330 F. Supp. at 1164.
231. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.), aff'g 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
232. The Green court's order applied only to schools in Mississippi. 330 F. Supp. at 1176. The
court stated, however, that the IRS "would be within its authority in including similar require-
ments for all schools of the nation." ld Further, the court stated: "[tlo obviate any possible
confusion the court is not to be misunderstood as laying down a special rule for schools located in
Mississippi." Id at 1174.
233. Rev. RuL 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
234. Id Revenue Ruling 71-447 provides in part:
A "racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students" is defined as meaning that the
school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities
generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the school does
not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, admis-
sions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other school-adminis-
tered programs.
Id (emphasis added). See also Status Hearings (pt. 2), supra note 213, at 1307. The ruling ex-
pressly adopted the Green court's position on the law of charitable trusts:
[Riacial discrimination in education is contrary to Federal public policy. Therefore, a
school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not "charitable"
within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and
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nue procedure235 that provided guidelines for private schools in
publicizing their nondiscriminatory policies. 236  Nevertheless, civil
rights groups attacked the IRS for failing to sufficiently enforce and
clarify guidelines for determining whether private schools discrimi-
nated on the basis of race.237 In response to this criticism, the IRS is-
sued new guidelines requiring more detailed publication of
nondiscriminatory policies.238 In the same year, religious schools
claiming that racial discrimination was required by the tenets of their
religious beliefs were brought within the IRS requirements.
239
In 1976, the plaintiffs in Green reopened the case and charged the
IRS with failing to effectively enforce the order issued by the court.240
In a separate action, black parents and their children filed a class action
suit before the same court,24' charging the IRS with violating section
in other relevant Federal statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization
exempt from Federal income tax.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 231.
235. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834.
236. Id
237. 3 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT-1974: To ENSURE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 183-85 (1975). The report of the
Commission on Civil Rights indicated that there were "serious and pervasive deficiencies in the
[IRS]'s approach to nondiscrimination enforcement .... See Status Hearings (pi. 2), supra note
213, at 736 (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, United States Commission on Civil
Rights). See also Sanders, supra note 11, at 234.
238. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. This revenue procedure superceded the 1972 proce-
dures, and required all tax exempt private schools to adopt formal nondiscriminatory policies; to
publish these policies annually; to include them in all school catalogs and brochures; and to keep
detailed records on the maintenance of these policies. Id Nevertheless, the guidelines were at-
tacked for failing to ensure actual nondiscrimination by schools who, following the guidelines,
were willing to maintain aformal policy of nondiscrimination. Administration's Change in Policy
Hearing, supra note 216, at 26 (statement of Michael I. Sanders); Note, supra note 214, at 381. In
the hearings on the 1978 proposed revenue procedure, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
admitted the need for stronger rules. See Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 5 (statement of
Jerome Kurtz). See also Note, supra note 214, at 381.
239. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
240. Green v. Simon, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C., filed July 23, 1976) (later docketed as Green v.
Miller).
241. Wright v. Simon, No. 76-1426 (D.D.C., filed July 30, 1976) (later docketed as Wright v.
Miller). In 1977, the Green and Wright cases were consolidated. Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69
(D.D.C. April 5, 1977). The district court dismissed the Wright component as nonjusticiable in
1979, see Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), but six months later the same court
granted the relief requested by plaintiffs in the Green component, see Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69
(D.D.C. May 5, 1980). The Wright plaintiffs then appealed the dismissal. See Wright v. Regan,
656 F.2d 820 (1981) (plaintiffs had standing to sue). See generally Note, supra note 214, at 381-82
an.17-19 (discussing the disposition of the Wright decision). For a discussion of the history of the
Green and Wright cases, see generally Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 823-26 (1981).
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501(c)(3), the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964, and the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 242 In response to these actions, the IRS issued
a proposed revenue procedure in 1978243 that promulgated specific and
rigid guidelines for determining when a presumption of discrimination
existed.2 " It also stated that in "appropriate" cases the guidelines
242. See Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 792 (1979).
243. Prop. Rev. Proc., 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978), reprinted in Status Hearings (pt. I), supra
note 6, at 25-38. The IRS issued the proposed procedure in order to invite public comment. The
result was a series of hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight, at which over 250
witnesses testified. The IRS received over 125,000 written responses critical of the proposed pro-
cedure. See Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6; Status Hearings (pt. 2), supra note 213; see also
Administration's Change in Policy Hearing, supra note 216, at 26 (statement of Michael I. Sanders);
Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978, § A, at 25, col. 1.
244. Prop. Rev. Proc., 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978), reprinted in Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra
note 6, at 25-38. The proposed procedure established means to determine which schools, although
conforming to the technical requirements of Rev. Proc. 75-50, were nonetheless discriminatory in
fact. See supra note 238. See also Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 11, at 232. The proposed
procedure identified two classes of schools that would be considered presumptively unqualified for
tax exemption, absent strong evidence in rebuttal, because of their discriminatory admissions poli-
cies. First, schools that had been adjudicated to be discriminatory in a state or federal court
("adjudicated schools"); and second, schools that had an insignificant number of minority stu-
dents and which were formed or expanded at or about the time of public school desegregation in
the community ("reviewable schools"). 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, at 37,297-98, reprintedin Status Hear-
ings (ft. 1), supra note 6, at 31-32. These two classes of schools could rebut the prima facie
presumption of discrimination by either showing that there were a significant number of minority
students ("20 percent of the percentage of the minority school age population in the community")
or by showing that they were in good faith operating on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id at 37,298,
reprinted in Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 31-33. Proof of good faith nondiscrimination
required a showing of four out of the following five factors:
1. Availability of and granting of scholarships or other financial assistance on a sig-
nificant basis to minority students.
2. Active and vigorous minority recruitment programs, such as contacting prospec-
tive minority students and organizations from which prospective minority students could
be identified.
3. An increasing percentage of minority student enrollment.
4. Employment of minority teachers or professional staff.
5. Other substantial evidence of good faith, including evidence of a combination of
lesser activities, such as-
(a) Continued and meaningful advertising programs beyond the requirements
of Revenue Procedure 75-50, or contacts with minority leaders inviting applications
from minority students.
(b) Significant efforts to recruit minority teachers.
(c) Participation with integrated schools in sports, music, and other events or
activities.
(d) Making school facilities available to outside, integrated civic or charitable
groups.
(e) Special minority-oriented curriculum or orientation programs.
(f) Minority participation in the founding of the school or current minority
board members.
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would apply to colleges and universities.245 Criticism 246 that arose re-
garding these guidelines forced the IRS to issue a revised proposed rev-
enue procedure in 1979.247 Under this revised version, the IRS
eliminated the mechanical tests for determining the existence of dis-
crimination in favor of a test based on the particular circumstances of
each case.248 The revised version substantially altered the criteria for
reviewing schools and changed the prima facie case with respect to
both adjudicated and reviewable schools.249 Nevertheless, the position
adopted by the IRS after the decision in Green remained essentially
Id at 37,298, reprinted in Status Hearings (pl. 1), supra note 6, at 33. See generaly Sanders, supra
note 11, at 236-37.
245. Id at 37,297,reprintedin Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 26. The proposed proce-
dure would also apply to church related schools described in Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
Id
246. See supra notes 11 & 243.
247. Prop. Rev. Proc., 44 Fed Reg. 9,451, corrected at 44 Fed. Reg. 11,021, reprinted in Status
Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 41-51 [hereinafter cited as Revised Procedure].
248. See IRS News Release (Feb. 9, 1979), reprintedin Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at
39 (the new procedure gives greater weight to each school's particular circumstances than did the
earlier proposal).
249. Revised Procedure, supra note 247, at 9,452-53, corrected at 11,021, reprinted in Status
Hearings (pl. 1), supra note 6, at 48-51. The revised procedure defined a "reviewable school" as
one meeting all the following tests:
(i) formed or substantially expanded atthe time of public school desegregation in the
community served by the school; (ii) which does not have significant minority student
enrollment; and, (iii) whose creation or substantial expansion was related in fact to pub-
lic school desegregation in the community.
Id at 9,452, corrected at 11,021, reprinted in Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 43. The
revised procedure also does not place the burden of proof of nondiscrimination on reviewable
schools, thereby eliminating the prima facie approach of the 1978 proposed procedure. It also
eliminated the good faith requirement of satisfying four out of five nondiscrimination factors, see
supra note 244. Further, the revised procedure applied only to primary and secondary schools,
thereby eliminating the "appropriate case" provision of the 1978 procedure, see supra note 244.
Finally, the revised procedure changed the mechanical tests for adjudicated schools to a case-by-
case approach, thereby allowing an adjudicated discriminatory school to qualify for tax exemption
if it can show, "on all the relevant facts and circumstances," that "(a) the school currently has
significant minority enrollment [defined in far more flexible terms than in the 1978 procedure] or,
(b) the school has undertaken actions or programs reasonably designed to attract minority stu-
dents on a continuing basis." Id at 9,454, corrected at 11,021, reprinted in Status Hearings (pt. 1),
supra note 6, at 48. The revised procedure, therefore, retains the "safe harbor" of the 1978 version
for private schools. It contains the following example:
[I]f 50 percent of the school age population in the community is minority, and the school
enrolls 200 students, a school would not be "reviewable" if it had at least 20 minority
students. (20 percent x 50 percent = 10 percent. 10 percent x 200 students = 20
students).
Id at 9,453, correctedat 11,021,reprinted in Status Hearings (pl. 1), supra note 6, at 44. Neverthe-
less, the revised proposed procedure made "rebuttal of an unfavorable presumption... consider-
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ably easier." Cohen, Exempt Status for Segregated Schools: Does the Constitution Permit Lower
Standardsfor Tax Benefts thanfor Direct Grants, 17 TAX NOTES 259, 264 (1982).
For a detailed discussion of the revised proposed procedure, see Neuberger & Crumplar, supra
note !1. See also Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 354-57 (statement of Martin D. Gins-
burg. Association of the Bar of the City of New York); Drake, Tax Status of Private Segregated
Schools: TheNew Revenue Procedure, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 463, 484-97 (1979); Sanders, supra
note 11, at 237-38.
Despite the increased flexibility of the revised version, the public reaction was unfavorable. See,
e.g., Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 388 (statement of W. Wayne Allen) ("horrible exam-
ple of bureaucratic overkill"); id at 460 (statement of Robert J. Billings) ("utterly and completely
void of statutory authority"); Status Hearings (pt. 2), supra note 211, at 581 (statement of W.M.
Gravatt, Jr.) ("usurp[ation of] the legislative powers of Congress"); id at 727 (statement of Sena-
tor Orrin G. Hatch) ("arbitrary, capricious, and amoral"); id at 930 (statement of James W.
Denink) ("[u]nreasonable discrimination against nonpublic schools"). See also Neuberger &
Crumplar, supra note 11, at 232 & n.26 ("most, if not all of the opposition ... concerned the
method by which the IRS sought to implement its policy and the fear of the future consequences
of that implementation") (footnote omitted). But see Administration's Change in Policy Hearing,
supra note 216:
[T]here is no doubt whatever that the denial of tax exemptions and deductions for ra-
cially discriminatory private schools reflects no mere policy preference by IRS officials;
such denial is, instead, the direct result of definitive federal court orders requiring the
Executive Branch to stop granting tax exemptions to private schools that discriminate on
the basis of race and tax deductions to those individuals whose contributions help keep
such schools afloat. Every federal appellate court to consider the issue since 1971 has
reached the same conclusion-namely, that the "policy" now denounced by the Admin-
istration as lacking legal foundation is, in truth, a rule of law mandated by the Internal
Revenue Code, properly construed.
Id at 12 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) (footnote omitted).
Neither of the proposed procedures was adopted by Congress. After hearings in both the
House, see Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6; Status Hearings (pt. 2), supra note 213, and the
Senate, see Hearings Before the Subcomm on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), Congress withheld all funds for IRS en-
forcement or formulation of procedures to withhold tax exemption of private schools. Two riders
were attached to the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1979). The first, introduced by Representative Ashbrook,
provided that:
None of the funds made available pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be used
to formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard, or
measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religions, or church-
operated schools under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless in
effect prior to August 22, 1978.
Id § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979). This amendment effectively forced the IRS to rely solely on
Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 58 as an enforcement mechanism. For a discussion of the ineffec-
tiveness of this procedure, see supra note 238. The second, introduced by Representative Dornan,
provided that: "None of the funds available under this Act may be used to carry out [either the
1978 proposed revenue procedure or the 1979 revised proposed procedure], or parts thereof."
Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Sat. 559, 577 (1979). Both the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments
remained in effect through fiscal 1982 and several months of fiscal 1983. Continuing Appropria-
tions For Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-276, - Stat. - (1982). See Cohen, supra, at 264 n.70.
See also Simon, supra note 229, at 481 n.21; Note, supra note 214, at 383-84 & nn.29-33. For a
discussion of the use of riders to appropriations legislation as a means of limiting agency power,
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unchanged until 1982.25 °
B. JudicialAnalysis: Green v. Connally
Three theories have been identified in support of the IRS position
denying tax exemptions to discriminatory schools.2"' All three theories
can be traced to Judge Leventhal's opinion in Green.252
L The Charitable Trust and Public Benefits Theories
Section 501(c)(3) exempts from income taxation "religious, charita-
ble, . . . or educational" organizations.25 3 Neither the Code nor the
Treasury Regulations adequately define "charitable," but clearly it is
not to be used "in a street. . . sense (such as, . benevolence to the
poor and suffering). 254 The Green court analogized the use of the term
in the Code to the common law of charitable trusts, 2 5 thereby implicat-
ing the inherent requirement that a charitable trust provide some bene-
fit to the public.256  The rationale for providing preferred treatment to
charitable trusts257 is that they provide a public benefit.25" A fortiori, a
trust could not be considered charitable if it was illegal or contrary to
see generally Parnell, Congressional nteoference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89
YALE L.J. 1360 (1980).
250. For a detailed discussion of the Green decision, see infra notes 252-73 and accompanying
text. Although Congress withheld funds for IRS enforcement of the 1978 and 1979 proposed
procedures, see supra note 249, it did not do so for Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 158. Neverthe-
less, IRS enforcement under the 1975 procedure has been ineffective. See supra note 238 and
accompanying text. See also Cohen, supra note 249, at 263 ("While there is no consensus as to the
total number of segregated private schools, even the lowest estimate indicates that only a tiny
fraction have been denied exemptions.").
251. See Simon, supra note 229, at 483-500 & n.26 (distinguishing between "public policy"
and "public benefits" theories). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (1980),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-3); Status Hearings (pi. 1), supra note 6, at 33-37
(statement of Michael I. Sanders).
252. 330 F. Supp. at 1157-61 (charitable trust and public benefits theories, see infra notes 253-
59 and accompanying text), 1161-63 (public policy theory, see infra notes 260-73 and accompany-
ing text).
253. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
254. 330 F. Supp. at 1157 (citing Reiling, What is a Charitable Trust?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 527
(1958)). See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1954) ("The term 'charitable' is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense .... .
255. 330 F. Supp. at 1157-61.
256. Id (citing Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877)). See 4 G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411, at 318. See also Duffy v. Birmingham, 190
F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 comment b (1969).
257. See Sanders, supra note 11, at 235 & n.5 ("benefits designed to protect [trusts']
existence").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/6
Number 2] TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
public policy,259 and thus would not qualify as a charitable organiza-
tion under section 501(c)(3).
2 The Public Policy Theory
The Green court also relied in part on the public policy doctrine rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.2" In Tank Truck, the Court held that a trucking company
could not deduct fines paid for violations of state maximum weight
laws as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under the Internal
Revenue Code.26 The Court stated that allowing the deduction would
"frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particu-
lar types of conduct."262 The Court reasoned that the public policy
doctrine allowed the courts the flexibility to "accommodate both the
congressional intent to tax only net income, and the presumption
against congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public
policy.
'
"
2 6 3
Applying this theory, the court in Green balanced the congressional
intent to exempt educational organizations from income taxation
against the declared federal policy of nondiscrimination.264 The Court
258. 330 F. Supp. at 1158. See Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (1941) (dis-
cussed supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text). See generally Sanders, supra note 11, at 235.
259. 330 F. Supp. at 1159-60 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 comment c
(1959)). The Green court stated: "This public policy doctrine operates as a necessary exception to
or qualifier of the precept that in general trusts for education are considered to be for the benefit of
the community. Otherwise, for example, Fagin's school for pickpockets would qualify for a chari-
table trust." 330 F. Supp. at 1160. The court's analogy to Fagin's school of pickpockets was
discussed in oral argument before the Supreme Court in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 50
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981):
Justice Stevens asked whether the IRS would not have the discretion to deny tax-
exempt status to a school whose primary purpose was to train pickpockets.
"A school for pickpockets is not organized exclusively for educational purposes,"
McNairy [counsel for Goldsboro Christian Schools] replied.
"Why not?" Justice Stevens asked.
"It's organized for criminal purposes," McNairy replied.
"It's still teaching something, isn't it?" Justice Stevens retorted amidst a ripple of
laughter.
Id at 3296.
260. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
261. Id at 37. See I.R.C. § 23(a)(l)(A) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976)).
262. 356 U.S. at 33.
263. Id at 35.
264. 330 F. Supp. at 1163-64. The court stated:
The Internal Revenue Code provisions on charitable exemptions and deductions must
be construed to avoid frustrations of Federal policy. Under the conditions of today they
can no longer be construed so as to provide to private schools operating on a racially
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found that the policy against racial discrimination outweighed congres-
sional intent to benefit educational institutions265 and thereby upheld
the IRS denial of tax exempt status to discriminatory schools.26 6 The
Supreme Court affirmed Green, 67 but because the IRS had changed its
position during the course of litigation, the Court later stated in dictum
that Green "lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a truly
adversary controversy." 26 Nevertheless, the decision in Green is con-
sistent with subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court269 and re-
flects an incisive analysis of both Tank Truck and the common law of
charitable trusts. That Green was correctly decided is reflected also in
Congress' subsequent addition of section 501(i) to the Internal Revenue
Code.270 Under this provision, racially discriminatory social clubs27 1
are denied tax exempt status. Congress, by enacting section 501(i), ex-
pressly overruled that part of McGlotten v. Connally2 72 that held that
racially discriminatory social clubs were entitled to tax exempt status
discriminatory premise the support of the exemptions and deductions which Federal tax
law affords to charitable organizations and their sponsors.
Id See Sanders, supra note 11, at 235.
265. 330 F. Supp. at 1162-63.
266. Id at 1164. See supra note 264.
267. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.), af9'g 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
268. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.l 1 (1974). For a discussion of this foot-
note, see Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 367 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe) ("in
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the aflrmance in Green,. . . the Court has made plain
that the holding of Green was correct as a matter of Federal constitutional law"). See also Cohen,
supra note 249, at 261 n.43 ("The characterization of Green as 'non-adversarial' is erroneous.");
Sanders, supra note 11, at 235 ("The meaning of this [footnote] is unclear, since the defendant-
intervenors opposed plaintiffs contentions before both the lower court and the Supreme Court.").
Interestingly, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the Supreme Court cited its affirmance
in Green as support for its statement that "[t]his Court has consistently affirmed decisions en-
joining State tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools." Id at
463 & n.6. See Status Hearings (p1. 1), supra note 6, at 367 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe).
269. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973). See also Sanders, supra note 11, at 235 & nn.9 & 11.
270. I.R.C. § 501(i) (Supp. V 1981). It would be difficult to argue that Congress was not ap-
proving the Green decision by enacting this provision. See, e.g., Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820,
834 n.40 (1981) ("Congress appears to agree with the Green court"); S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 n.5 (1976),reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6051, 6058 n.5;Admrinlstra-
lion's Change in Policy Hearings, supra note 214, at 12 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe); id at 21
(statement of Albert J. Rosenthal); id at 273 (statement of Archibald Cox). See also Note, supra
note 214, at 389 ("Congress' failure to repeal explicitly any of the IRS publications guidelines
adopted before August 1978 [see supra note 249] suggests agreement with the Green court.").
271. Social clubs are exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
272. 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972).
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under section 501(c)(7).273
Several decisions subsequent to Green add support to the policies
underlying the IRS efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in private
schools. In Norwood P. Harrison,74 the Supreme Court held, without
dissent,275 that economic benefit in the form of a textbook loan pro-
gram could not be extended to racially discriminatory schools even if
the program applied to all private schools.276 In Runyon v. M Crary,277
the parents of black children filed suit against private nonsectarian
schools for violations of section 1981.278 The parents alleged that their
children were denied admission solely because of their race,279 and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. 2 0  The Court
held that racially discriminatory admissions policies violate section
1981211 and thereby recognized the clear federal policy against racial
discrimination in education.28 2 Furthermore, the Court held that a sec-
tion 1981 violation exists in these circumstances regardless whether the
school receives federal or state aid.28 3
273. Id See S. REP. No. 1318, supra note 270, renrinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6051.
274. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
275. Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred in the result. Id at 471.
276. Id at 462-63. See Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions
that Discriminate on the Basis ofRace, 65 IowA L. REV. 258, 269 n.97 (1979).
277. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
278. Id Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). For a general discussion of section 1981 applicability to racially discrimi-
natory schools, see Note, Section 1981 Liabilityfor Racially Discriminatory Sectarian Schools, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1237 (1981); Note, Freedom ofReligion as a Defense to a § 1981 Action
Against a Racially Discriminatory Private School, 53 NoTPE DAME LAW. 107 (1977).
279. 427 U.S. at 164-65.
280. Id at 164.
281. Id at 172.
282. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 11, at 236; Note, supra note 278, at 1239 n. 11. See also
Status Hearings (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue) ("The Runyon decision amplifies the strong public policy against racial discrimination
in private schools .. ").
283. 427 U.S. at 173 ("§ 1981, like § 1982, reaches private conduct"). See also Status Hearings
(pt. 1), supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue). Cf.
Prince Edward School Found. v. United States, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980) (upholding
withdrawal of tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private school), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
944 (1981); Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977)
(same), aff'dmer., 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-1); Brum-
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C Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools
The conflict between the IRS and segregationist religious schools has
a long and convoluted history.284 The controversy raises significant
questions about the scope of the IRS's authority and the constitutional-
ity of revoking the tax exempt status of discriminatory religious
schools. 285 On the one hand, the IRS argues that religious schools are
not excepted from the nondiscrimination requirements of Green and
subsequent IRS rulings.286 Religious schools, on the other hand, argue
that a nondiscrimination policy as applied to schools with a sincerely
held religious belief in separation of the races interferes with the free
exercise of these beliefs.28 7 In addition, discriminatory schools argue
that by withdrawing their tax exemptions the government establishes
those religions which do not practice racial discrimination. 288
Bob Jones University has been actively engaged in litigation over
these issues for almost ten years.2 89 The school claims that its discrimi-
field v. Dodd, 425 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. La. 1976) (discriminatory private schools unqualified for
state financial support).
284. See supra notes 213-83 and accompanying text. See also 51 U.S.L.W. 3295 (1982).
285. See, ag., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'g 468 F.
Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-3). See also supra note 14.
See generally Laycock, supra note 213, at 261-66.
286. 639 F.2d at 150.
287. See generally Administration's Change in Policy Hearing, supra note 216 (statements of
various churches, church leaders, and church-related school administrators); Status Hearings (pt.
I), supra note 6 (same).
288. See, e.g., 639 F.2d at 153-54. See also infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
289. Bob Jones University first filed suit against the United States in 1971 in an effort to enjoin
the IRS from withdrawing its tax exempt status. Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277
(1971), re'd, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973), aftd, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
Bob Jones University was founded in 1927, and moved to its present South Carolina location in
the late 1940s. It is a Christian fundamentalist religious and education institution, although it is
not affiliated with a religious denomination. 639 F.2d at 149. The school's Certificate of Incorpo-
ration states the purposes of the institution as follows:
The general nature and object of the corporation shall be to conduct an institution of
learning for the general education of youth in the essentials of culture and in the arts and
sciences, giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the
Holy Scriptures, combating all atheistic, agnostic, pagan and so-called scientific adulter-
ations of the Gospel, unqualifiedly affirming and teaching the inspiration of the Bible
(both Old and New Testaments); the creation of man by the direct act of God; the incar-
nation and virgin birth of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ; His identification as the
Son of God, His vicarious atonement for the sins of mankind by the shedding of His
blood on the Cross; the resurrection of His body from the tomb; His power to save men
from sin; the new birth through the regeneration by the Holy Spirit; and the gift of
eternal life by the grace of God.
Id at 148 n.l. The school maintains a strict fundamentalist approach to education, requiring all
teachers to be "born again" Christians, and prospective students undergo close scrutiny of their
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natory policies are mandated by the Bible,2 9° and therefore uniformly
denied admission to blacks until 197 1.291 Thereafter, until 1975, Bob
Jones University denied admission only to unmarried blacks because
the IRS was investigating the admissions policies to determine if the
university's tax exemption should be revoked. In 1975, the school filed
suit to enjoin the IRS from revoking its exempt status.292 The Supreme
Court denied the request for injunctive relief,2 93 thus prompting the
university to again change its policy to prohibiting interracial dating
and marriage of its students.294 The IRS revoked Bob Jones Univer-
sity's tax exempt status in 1976, which was made retroactively effec-
tive,291 and after paying twenty-one dollars in FUTA (Federal
Unemployment Tax Act) taxes, Bob Jones University filed suit for a
refund.296 The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina held that the IRS did not have the authority to revoke the
university's tax exemption, and that by so doing the IRS violated the
school's first amendment rights.2 97 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in
religious belief upon application to the school. 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978). The school
also strictly regulates student activities:
The institution does not permit dancing, card playing, the use of tobacco, movie-going,
and other such forms of indulgences in which wordly [sic] young people often engage; no
student will release information of any kind to any local newspaper, radio station, or
television station without first checking with the University Public Relations Director,
students are expected to refrain from singing, playing, and, as far as possible, from "tun-
ing-in" on the radio or playing on the record player jazz, rock-and-roll, folk rock, or any
other types of questionable music; and, no young man may walk a girl on campus unless
both of them have a legitimate reason for going in the same direction.
Id
290. Id at 895.
291. 639 F.2d at 149.
292. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
293. Id at 746.
294. 639 F.2d at 149. Bob Jones University changed its policies after the Supreme Court, in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), prohibited racial discrimination by private schools. See
supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text. The school's post-Run on rules contained the follow-
ing provisions:
There is to be no interracial dating.
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which
holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's dat-
ing rules and regulations will be expelled.
639 F.2d at 149 (emphasis in original).
295. 468 F. S'-p. at 893.
296. Id The government counterclaimed for approximately $490,000 in unpaid taxes from
December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975. Id
297. Id at 907. The district court's conclusion was based in large part on its finding that Bob
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Bob Jones University v. United States reversed, and held that the IRS
had authority under the Internal Revenue Code to revoke Bob Jones
University's tax exemption.298 In addition, the court held that revoca-
tion of a racially discriminatory religious school's tax exempt status
does not violate either religion clause of the first amendment. 299 The
Fourth Circuit argued that both the purpose and history of section
501(c)(3) supported the IRS action,3°° and confirmed the Green "syllo-
gism" derived from the common law of charitable trusts.30 ' Further,
the court found that Bob Jones University's racial policies violated the
declared public policy against racial discrimination, 0 2 and the more
specific policy against public subsidization of discrimination in educa-
tion.30 3 The court recognized the need for a "prophylactic rule to pre-
vent [indirect public] support' ' 314 of racial discrimination, even when
sincerely held religious belief was posited as the reason for the discrim-
inatory practice. 0 5 Relying on the balancing test of Wisconsin v.
Jones University was primarily a religious, as opposed to educational, institution. Id at 897. The
court, addressing the school's post-1975 rules prohibiting interracial dating and marriage, con-
cluded that these rules were based on seriously held religious beliefs, and therefore revocation of
the school's tax exemption violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id at 898.
Further, the district court held that by revoking the tax exempt status of discriminatory schools,
the IRS established schools more "in tune with federal public policy." Id at 900. Finally, the
court held that, despite the decision in Green, the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) was incor-
rect because the word "charitable" in the statute was not intended to modify the other categories,
see supra note 5. In other words, the court held that in order to qualify for tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3), an organization need not satisfy the charitable trust requirement of conformity
to declared public policy. Id at 901-04. For an excellent critique of the district court's opinion,
and its "unprecedented" absolute protection of religious freedom, see Comment, supra note 276.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed as "simplistic" the district court's argument that section 501(c)(3)
does not require conformity to the federal policy against racial discrimination. See 639 F.2d at
151.
298. Id at 152, 155, rev'g 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978). The court stated that the univer-
sity's post-1975 policies, see supra note 291, were racially discriminatory. 639 F.2d at 152 (citing
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
299. 639 F.2d at 153-54 (free exercise, see infra notes 304-08 and accompanying text), 154-55
(establishment, see infra notes 309-13 and accompanying text).
300. 639 F.2d at 151 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1820, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939)).
301. 639 F.2d at 151. See H.R. REP. No. 1820, supra note 300. The term "Green syllogism"
derives from oral argument before the Supreme Court by counsel for Bob Jones University. The
syllogism is described as follows: "Major premise: organizations that violate public policy cannot
be tax-exempt. Minor premise: racial discrimination is against public policy. Conclusion: orga-
nizations that practice racial discrimination cannot be tax-exempt." See 51 U.S.L.W. 3295 (1982).
302. 639 F.2d at 151.
303. Id
304. Id at 152-53.
305. Id
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Yoder,"° the court held that the compelling governmental interest in
eliminating all forms of racial discrimination" 7 outweighed the burden
placed on the university's religious practices.30 Finally, the court re-
jected the district court's holding that the government effectively estab-
lishes religions that do not discriminate on the basis of race by denying
tax exemptions to those that do.309 The district court had earlier held
that this undermines the second prong of the Lemon test for establish-
ment clause cases.3 10  The Fourth Circuit, although recognizing the
principle of government neutrality in matters of religion,3 1  neverthe-
less argued that this principle does not prevent the government "from
enforcing its most fundamental constitutional and societal values by
means of a uniform policy, neutrally applied. ' 12 Thus, the court recog-
nized that the governmental interest in nondiscrimination is so compel-
ling that religious beliefs which are in conflict must "yield in [its]
favor.,"3
13
In 1981 the Supreme Court agreed to review Bob Jones. t 4 The
306. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
307. 639 F.2d at 153.
308. Id at 153-54. The court noted that although "[a] law which penalizes a person indirectly
for practicing his belief may violate the Free Exercise Clause . . . [t]he indirect nature of the
penalty' is,. . . a factor to be considered in the balance." Id at 153 n.8 (citation omitted).
309. Id at 154-55. See supra note 297 (discussion of district court opinion).
310. 468 F. Supp. at 900. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision in Lemon, see supra
notes 79-88 and accompanying text. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
311. 639 F.2d at 154 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) and Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
312. 639 F.2d at 154. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also supra notes 110-
25 and accompanying text.
313. 639 F.2d at 154. The court stated that its ruling would not excessively entangle the gov-
ernment with religion: "[Tihe only inquiry is whether the school maintains racially neutral poli-
cies. And, the uniform application of the rule to all religiously operated schools avoids the
necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into whether a racially restrictive practice is the
result of sincere religious belief." Id at 155 (emphasis in original). Accord Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aft'dper curiam by unpublished
order No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-1).
314. 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981). The Supreme Court consolidated Bob Jones with Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), ajf'dper curiam by
unpublished order No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (No. 81-
1).
The Justice Department originally asked the Supreme Court to affirm the Fourth Circuit deci-
sion in Bob Jones and the district court decision in Goldsboro, stating in its petition that "the
Federal Government's commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination in education [is]
manifested both in the Constitution and in many Federal statutes and the national policy prohibit-
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events of the months following the Court's grant of certiorari, however,
threatened to undermine the government's eleven year policy against
exempting racially discriminatory schools. On January 8, 1982, the
Reagan administration publicly announced a reversal in policy.315
First, the Department of Treasury announced that it had no authority
to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools, and would
therefore begin to grant exemptions to these schools. 316 Second, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a memorandum requesting the
Supreme Court to vacate as moot the judgments of the Fourth Cir-
cuit.317 In effect, the government confessed error,31 8 opened the flood-
gates to new applications for exemption, and permitted reapplication
by over 100 racially discriminatory schools which had previously lost
their exempt status.319
Responding to heated public reaction to these announcements, 320 the
Reagan administration retreated by announcing its intention to seek
legislation giving the IRS express authority to deny tax exemptions to
ing public subsidy of racially discriminatory educational institutions, whether public or private."
See United States Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d
147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981), quotedin Weithorn, supra note 220, at 300.
The government's position changed substantially in 1982 when the Reagan administration at-
tempted to reverse the long-standing IRS policy of denying tax exemptions to racially discrimina-
tory schools. See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
315. U.S. Dept. of Treasury Press Release, Jan. 8, 1982, reprinted inAdministraion's Change in
Policy Hearing, supra note 216, at 607.
316. Id
317. Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate as Moot, Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981), reprinted in Administration'r Change in
Policy Hearing, supra note 216, at 612-14. The memorandum stated:
Since the filing of our Brief acquiescing in the granting of certiorari in these cases, the
Department of the Treasury has initiated the necessary steps to grant petitioner Golds-
boro Christian Schools tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code, and to
refund to it federal social security and unemployment taxes in dispute. Similarly, the
Treasury Department has initiated the necessary steps to reinstate tax-exempt status
under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code to petitioner Bob Jones University, and will refund
to it federal social security and unemployment taxes in dispute. Finally, the Treasury
Department has commenced the process necessary to revoke forthwith the pertinent
Revenue Rulings that were relied upon to deny petitioners tax-exempt status under the
Code.
Id (footnote omitted).
318. See id A draft memorandum was prepared but never filed expressly confessing error.
See Administration's Change in Policy Hearing, supra note 216, at 603.
319. See Weithorn, supra.note 220, at 300.
320. See, e.g., Lewis, Shucks, It's Only the Law, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1982, at A23, col. 3;
Kraft, A Con Job, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1982, at A19, col. 1; Wolfman, Law, Cut on a Bias, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1982, at A27, col. 1. See also Cohen, sufpra note 249, at 259 n.5.
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discriminatory schools.32 1 The President's proposed legislation was in-
troduced in the Senate as S.2024322 on January 28, 1982, but "lan-
321. Presidential Press Release, Jan. 12, 1982, reprinted in Administration'r Change in Policy
Hearing, supra note 216, at 620.
322. S. 2024, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. SI00-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982). The
proposed bill provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of(Representatives of the United States ofAmerica
in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DENIAL OF TAX EXEMPTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS MAIN-
TAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
POLICIES.
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to exemption from tax) is
amended by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k) and inserting a new subsection
(j) reading as follows:
"(j) ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DIS-
CRIMINATORY POLICIES.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-An organization that normally maintains a regular faculty
and curriculum (other than an exclusively religious curriculum) and normally has a reg-
ularly enrolled body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activi-
ties are regularly carried on shall not be deemed to be described in subsection (c)(3), and
shall not be exempt from tax under subsection (a), if such organization has a racially
discriminatory policy.
"(2) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this subsection-
"(i) An organization has a 'racially discriminatory policy' if it refuses to admit stu-
dents of all races to the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or
made available to students by that organization, or if the organization refuses to admin-
ister its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, athletic
programs, or other programs administered by such organization in a manner that does
not discriminate on the basis of race. The term 'racially discriminatory policy' does not
include an admissions policy of a school, or a program of religious training or worship of
a school, that is limited, or grants preferences or priorities, to members of a particular
religious organization or belief: Proyided, That no such policy, program, preference, or
priority is based upon race or upon a belief that requires discrimination on the basis of
race.
"(ii) The term 'race' shall include color or national origin."
SEC. 2. DENIAL OF DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZA-
TIONS MAINTAINING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DISCRIMINA-
TORY POLICIES.
(a) Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to allowance of de-
ductions for certain charitable, etc., contributions and gifts) is amended by adding at the
end of subsection (f) a new paragraph (7) reading as follows:
"(7) DENIAL OF DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAIN-
ING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES.-No deduction shall be al-
lowed under this section for any contribution to or for the use of an organization
described in section 5010)(1) that has a racially discriminatory policy as defined in sec-
ton 501(j)(2)."
(b) Section 642 of such Code (relating to special rules for credits and deductions) is
amended by adding at the end of subsection (c) a new paragraph (7) reading as follows:
"(7) DENIAL OF DEDUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS MAINTAIN-
ING SCHOOLS WITH RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES.-No deduction shall be al-
lowed under this section for any contribution to or for the use of an organization
described in section 5010)(1) that has a racially discriminatory policy as defined in sec-
tion 501(j)(2)."
(c) Section 2055 of such Code (relating to the allowance of estate tax deductions for
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guished" 323 in Congress. Three weeks later, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a temporary in-
junction, in Wright v. Regan, 324 barring the IRS from granting tax ex-
emptions to any racially discriminatory schools. 325  This order
eliminated the mootness question in Bob Jones, and the government
again requested the Supreme Court to decide the issue. 326 The Court
will thus have the opportunity to put to rest the erroneous argument
that the federal government's compelling and clearly articulated inter-
est in eliminating all vestiges of racial discrimination can accommodate
indirect public economic support for private schools that practice racial
discrimination. The Court should recognize that section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code provides a mandate for the IRS to revoke
tax exemptions as a means for preventing continued racial discrimina-
tion by private schools. Finally, the Court should find that this con-
gressional mandate precludes the need for legislation granting express
authority to the IRS to revoke tax exemptions in these cases.
CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Service employs section 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code to regulate certain actions and policies of tax ex-
empt organizations. In recent years, the IRS has come under attack for
withdrawing tax exemptions as a means of restricting the degree of
church involvement in politics and as a means of eliminating racial
discrimination by private schools. These challenges to the authority of
the IRS are unwarranted. Although the Supreme Court has recognized
that neither religion nor government can be completely divorced from
transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses) is amended by adding at the end of
subsection (e) a new paragraph (4) reading as follows:
"(4) No deduction shall be allowed under this section for any transfer to or for the
use of an organization described in section 501(j)(1) that has a racially discriminatory
policy as defined in section 501(j)(2)."
(d) Section 2522 of such Code (relating to charitable and similar gifts) is amended by
adding at the end of subsection (c) a new paragraph (3) reading as follows:
"(3) No deduction shall be allowed under this section for any gift to or for the use or
[sic] an organization described in section 5010)(I) that has a racially discriminatory pol-
icy as defined in section 501(j)(2)."
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE
The amendments made by this Act shall apply after July 9, 1970.
Id
323. See 50 U.S.L.W. 3295 (1982).
324. No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982).
325. Id
326. See Cohen, supra note 249, at 259.
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the other,327 it has developed means whereby it can judge an appropri-
ate degree of involvement. The Court's limited application of the polit-
ical divisiveness test does not derogate the underlying policy reasons
for restricting religious involvement in politics. Congress codified the
governmental interest in separation of church and state in this area by
including the political activity restrictions in the Internal Revenue
Code. These restrictions limit the extent to which religious organiza-
tions may participate in politics, and are an effective and proper means
for doing so. Elimination of the Code restrictions would weaken the
already threatened wall of separation between church and state.
Similarly, proper construction of section 501(c)(3) requires tax ex-
empt organizations to conform to the declared federal policy against
racial discrimination. "There is a compelling as well as a reasonable
government interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which
stands on highest constitutional ground . -.328 Private schools that
discriminate on the basis of race violate this policy. They are not,
therefore, "charitable" organizations and should be denied the indirect
economic support that is an inherent element of tax exemption. The
Supreme Court is presently considering the issue, and should affirm the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Bob Jones University v. United States.329 A
contrary ruling would have a deleterious effect on society's necessary
and vital commitment to eliminating all forms of racial discrimination.
[On May 24, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Bob Jones University v. United States. The Court held that
racially discriminatory private schools are not charitable organizations
and do not qualify for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
grounded his opinion on the common law standards underlying the
Code's use of the term "charitable," thereby expressly affirming the
policy adopted by the IRS in 1970 and embodied in Revenue Ruling
71-447. Applying the public benefit and public policy theories, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "[i]t would be wholly incompatible with the
concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory educational entities. " The Court
327. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 605 (1971).
328. Green v. ConnaUy, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.), a dmem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
329. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
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also rejected the claim that a nondiscrimination policy applied to
schools with a sincerely held religious belief in racial separation vio-
lates the free exercise clause of the first amendment. The Court held
that the government's compelling interest in eliminating racial discrim-
ination in education justified "whatever burden denial of tax benefits
places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs."
In addition, the Court recognized that the IRS has the authority to
determine whether an organization is charitable under section
501(c)(3), and to deny or revoke an organization's tax exempt status if
"there is no doubt that the organization's activities violate fundamental
public policy." The Court determined that the various congressional
hearings, debates and revisions to the Internal Revenue Code-particu-
larly the enactment of section 501(i) denying tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory private social clubs-atfirmatively manifested Congress'
acquiescence in the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3). This find-
ing of congressional "ratification by implication" obviated the need for
specific legislation granting the IRS authority to apply Revenue Ruling
71-447.
Justice Powell, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
and Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, expressed serious concern with the
Court's acknowledgement of arguably broad IRS authority to define
public policy in determining qualification for tax exemption. In addi-
tion, Justice Rehnquist argued that despite the declared federal policy
against racial discrimination in education, the IRS and the courts ex-
ceed their authority by injecting a public policy requirement into sec-
tion 501(c)(3).]
Robert . Trautmann
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